United Nations S/2018/625

Security Council

Distr.: General
21 June 2018

Original: English

Letter dated 21 June 2018 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Sweden to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that, under the presidency of Sweden, the Security Council plans to hold an open debate on children and armed conflict with the theme "Protecting children today prevents conflicts tomorrow" on 9 July 2018 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Irina **Schoulgin Nyoni**
Ambassador
Deputy Permanent Representative
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

18-10213 (E) 260618

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Annex to the letter dated 21 June 2018 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Sweden to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Concept note for the Security Council open debate on children and armed conflict, to be held on 9 July 2018

Protecting children today prevents conflicts tomorrow

1. The open debate will be focused on how protecting children affected by armed conflict can contribute to conflict prevention and sustaining peace.

Protecting children and upholding their rights as building blocks for peaceful and sustainable societies

2. More than 20 years ago, in her report on the impact of armed conflict on children (A/51/306), which led to the introduction of the children and armed conflict agenda, Graça Machel concluded that the most effective way to protect children was to prevent the outbreak of armed conflict. While the Security Council may not be able to resolve all conflicts that it currently considers, it can strengthen the protection of children who are suffering as a result of them. The children and armed conflict agenda provides the tools to end and prevent violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law committed against children affected by armed conflict, and to hold perpetrators accountable.

3. Protecting children today is key to preventing future conflict. How we treat children affected by armed conflict has a bearing on their future and that of their communities and countries. Shielding children from the worst effects of war will improve the chances of preventing new cycles of conflict and sustaining peace in the future. Building on the Secretary-General's prevention agenda, Governments, the United Nations and civil society need to do more to strengthen the links between child protection, the rights of the child and conflict prevention and sustaining peace. More action is also needed to empower children and young people to become actors in peace and conflict prevention.

Successful reintegration in the best interests of the child and of society

4. We need to prioritize the effective reintegration of children formerly associated with armed forces or armed groups. By ensuring that every child in need has access to reintegration services, we can facilitate their return to a peaceful and productive life and break the cycle of conflict. However, reintegration does not take place in a vacuum, nor are former child soldiers the only people who need assistance to recover from the trauma of war. We need to ensure respect for the right to education — in particular for girls — and health care, including psychosocial support, for all children affected by armed conflict.

Peace processes as an important entry point for protecting children and building peaceful societies

5. In its resolution 1612 (2005), the Security Council called upon all parties to armed conflict to ensure that the protection, rights and well-being of children are specifically integrated into all peace processes and peace agreements. Even so, while children are often the most affected, their specific needs are often overlooked and their voices go unheard. Colombia and Nepal provide positive examples of how early commitments to protect children and their rights also worked as a confidence-building measure. To provide tools for actors involved in mediation and peace processes, and

in response to the request made in the statement by the President of the Security Council on 31 October 2017 (S/PRST/2017/21), a process to develop practical guidance on the integration of child protection issues into peace processes will be officially launched.

Questions

6. What can we do to:

(a) Promote and strengthen the links between child protection, the rights of the child and conflict prevention;

(b) Empower children and young people to become actors for peace and conflict prevention;

(c) Integrate the protection, rights and well-being of children into peace processes;

(d) Support Governments and regional and subregional organizations in building child protection capacity and formulate prevention strategies?

Format and briefers

7. The open debate will be held in the Security Council Chamber on 9 July 2018 at 10 a.m. The debate will be chaired by the Prime Minister of Sweden, Stefan Löfven.

8. Considering the large number of member States expected to participate in the open debate, all speakers are requested to limit their interventions in the Chamber to three minutes in duration. Member States will be able to upload longer versions of their statements for the record. Member States are also encouraged to speak in regional groups.

9. The following speakers will brief the Security Council:

- Virginia Gamba, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict
- Henrietta Fore, Executive Director of the United Nations Children's Fund
- Yenny Londoño, civil society representative

Expected outcome

10. The aim is to adopt a resolution at the open debate.

United Nations S/2018/626

Security Council

Distr.: General
26 June 2018

Original: English

Letter dated 22 June 2018 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to Security Council resolution 1966 (2010), by which the Council established the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals and, in particular, the appointment of the judges, the President and the Prosecutor of the Mechanism.

The terms of office of the current judges, the President and the Prosecutor will expire on 30 June 2018.

I recall that, under paragraph 17 of resolution 1966 (2010), the Council decided that the Mechanism would operate for an initial period of four years, starting from 1 July 2012. The Council also decided to review the progress of the work of the Mechanism, including in completing its functions, before the end of that initial period and every two years thereafter. The Council further decided that the Mechanism would continue to operate for subsequent periods of two years following each such review, unless it decided otherwise.

In accordance with the provisions of article 8 of the statute of the Mechanism, which is set out in annex 1 to resolution 1966 (2010), the Mechanism is to have a roster of 25 independent judges, not more than two of whom may be nationals of the same State.

Furthermore, article 10, paragraph 3, provides that the judges of the Mechanism are to be elected for a term of four years and are to be eligible for reappointment by the Secretary-General after consultation with the Presidents of the Security Council and of the General Assembly. By its resolution 2269 (2016), the Council decided that, notwithstanding that provision, the judges of the Mechanism might be appointed or reappointed for a two-year term.

Pursuant to article 9, paragraph 1, of the statute, the judges are to be persons of high moral character, impartiality and integrity who possess the qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to the highest judicial offices. Particular account is to be taken of experience as judges of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia or the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.

The Government of Turkey has informed the Secretariat that Judge Aydin Sefa Akay is no longer eligible to be a judge in Turkey and does not possess the qualifications for appointment to the highest judicial office in Turkey under the applicable law. The Government has provided supporting material in this regard. In the light of the information furnished by the Government and a review of the relevant material, it is considered that Judge Akay does not currently meet the qualification

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requirements for judges of the Mechanism under article 9, paragraph 1, of the statute and, consequently, cannot be considered for reappointment.

The Office of Legal Affairs has consulted the other 24 judges of the Mechanism to ascertain their interest in and availability for reappointment. One, Judge Bakone Moloto (South Africa), has replied that he does not wish to be reappointed.

Therefore, I intend to reappoint the 23 judges of the Mechanism who are listed in the annex to the present letter for a term of two years, from 1 July 2018 to 30 June 2020, which will be in line with the upcoming period of operation of the Mechanism. I look forward to receiving your views on the proposed reappointment of the judges, in accordance with article 10, paragraph 3, of the statute.

Concerning the President of the Mechanism, article 11, paragraph 1, of the statute provides that, after consultation with the President of the Council and the judges of the Mechanism, the Secretary-General is to appoint a full-time President from among the judges of the Mechanism. The statute, resolution 1966 (2010) and subsequent resolutions are silent on the length of the term of office of the President.

Having consulted the judges of the Mechanism, I intend to reappoint Judge Theodor Meron (United States of America) as President for a new term of office from 1 July 2018 to 18 January 2019, and to appoint Judge Carmel Agius (Malta) as President with effect from 19 January 2019 to 30 June 2020. Judge Agius has previously served as President and Vice-President of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.

I look forward to receiving your views on the proposed reappointment of Judge Meron and the appointment of Judge Agius, in accordance with article 11, paragraph 1, of the statute.

Regarding the Prosecutor, article 14, paragraph 4, of the statute provides that the Prosecutor is to be appointed by the Council on nomination by the Secretary-General. The Prosecutor is to be of high moral character and possess the highest level of competence and experience in the conduct of investigations and prosecutions of criminal cases. The Prosecutor is to serve for a four-year term and is to be eligible for reappointment. The terms and conditions of service are to be those of an Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations. By its resolution 2269 (2016), the Council decided that, notwithstanding article 14, paragraph 4, of the statute, the Prosecutor might be appointed or reappointed for a two-year term.

I hereby nominate Serge Brammertz (Belgium) for reappointment as Prosecutor of the Mechanism for a new two-year term, from 1 July 2018 to 30 June 2020.

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and its annex to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) António **Guterres**

Annex

Candidates for reappointment as judges of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals

Mr. Carmel A. Agius (Malta)

Mr. Jean-Claude Antonetti (France)

Ms. Florence Rita Arrey (Cameroon)

Mr. Ben Emmerson (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland)

Mr. Christoph Flügge (Germany)

Ms. Graciela Susana Gatti Santana (Uruguay)

Mr. Burton Hall (Bahamas)

Ms. Elizabeth Ibanda-Nahamya (Uganda)

Mr. Vagn Joensen (Denmark)

Mr. Gberdao Gustave Kam (Burkina Faso)

Mr. Liu Daqun (China)

Mr. Joseph E. Chiondo Masanche (United Republic of Tanzania)

Mr. Theodor Meron (United States of America)

Mr. Lee Gacuiga Muthoga (Kenya)

Ms. Aminatta Lois Runeni N'gum (Zimbabwe/Gambia)

Ms. Prisca Matimba Nyambe (Zambia)

Mr. Alphonsus Martinus Maria Orie (Netherlands)

Mr. Seymour Panton (Jamaica)

Mr. Seon Ki Park (Republic of Korea)

Mr. José Ricardo de Prada Solaesa (Spain)

Mr. Mparany Mamy Richard Rajohnson (Madagascar)

Mr. Ivo Nelson de Caires Batista Rosa (Portugal)

Mr. William H. Sekule (United Republic of Tanzania)

United Nations S/2018/627

Security Council

Distr.: General
26 June 2018

Original: English

Letter dated 26 June 2018 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 22 June 2018 (S/2018/626) concerning your intentions to reappoint 23 judges of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, listed in the annex to your letter, for a term of two years with effect from 1 July 2018 to 30 June 2020, to reappoint Judge Theodor Meron (United States of America) as President of the Mechanism for a new term of office, from 1 July 2018 to 18 January 2019, and to appoint Judge Carmel Agius (Malta) as President with effect from 19 January 2019 to 30 June 2020, and your nomination of Serge Brammertz (Belgium) for reappointment as Prosecutor of the Mechanism for a new two-year term, from 1 July 2018 to 30 June 2020, has been brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. They take note of the intentions and nomination expressed in your letter.

(*Signed*) Vassily A. **Nebenzia**
President of the Security Council

18-10381 (E) 260618

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United Nations S/2018/628

Security Council

Distr.: General
27 June 2018

Original: English

Peru: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its determination to combat impunity for all those responsible for serious international crimes and the necessity of all persons indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), and the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) being brought to justice and, in this regard, *recalling* the mandate of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (Mechanism) established by resolution 1966 (2010) of 22 December 2010,

Recalling the Security Council Press Statement of 31 December 2017,

Recalling Article 25 and Article 26 of the Statute of the Mechanism, set out in Annex 1 to resolution 1966 (2010), concerning the supervision of the enforcement of sentences and pardon or commutation of sentences, respectively,

Having regard to Article 14, paragraph 4 of the Statute of the Mechanism,

Recalling its decision in resolution 2269 (2016) adopted on 29 February 2016 appointing the Prosecutor of the Mechanism for a period from 1 March 2016 until 30 June 2018, and that the Prosecutor of the Mechanism may be appointed or reappointed for a two-year term, notwithstanding Article 14, paragraph 4 of the Statute of the Mechanism,

Having considered the nomination by the Secretary-General to Mr. Serge Brammertz as Prosecutor of the Mechanism (S/2018/626),

Noting with concern that the Mechanism faces problems in the relocation of acquitted persons and convicted persons who have completed serving their sentences, and emphasizing the importance of the successful relocation of such persons,

Recalling its decision by resolution 1966 (2010) that the Mechanism shall operate for an initial period of four years from the first commencement date referred to in paragraph 1 of the resolution, and to review the progress of the work of the Mechanism, including in completing its functions, before the end of this initial period and every two years thereafter, and that the Mechanism shall continue to operate for subsequent periods of two years following each such review, unless the Security Council decides otherwise,

Noting that the current period of operation of the Mechanism ends on 30 June 2018,

Having conducted its review of the progress of the work of the Mechanism, including in completing its functions, since the last review of the Mechanism in

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December 2015, pursuant to paragraph 17 of resolution 1966 (2010) and in accordance with the procedure set out in the statement of its President of 19 March 2018 (S/PRST/2018/6),

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Decides* to appoint Mr. Serge Brammertz as Prosecutor of the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals with effect from 1 July 2018 until 30 June 2020;

2. *Underlines* that States should cooperate fully with the Mechanism;

3. *Commends* States that have accepted the relocation of acquitted persons or convicted persons who have completed serving their sentences to their territories, and reiterates its call upon all States to cooperate with and render all necessary assistance to the Mechanism, for increased efforts towards the relocation of acquitted persons and convicted persons who have completed serving their sentences;

4. *Urges* all States, especially States where fugitives are suspected to be at large, to intensify their cooperation with and render all necessary assistance to the Mechanism, in particular to achieve the arrest and surrender of all remaining fugitives indicted by the ICTR as soon as possible;

5. *Emphasizes* that, in view of the substantially reduced nature of the residual functions, the Mechanism was established to be a small, temporary and efficient structure, whose functions and size will diminish over time, with a small number of staff commensurate with its reduced functions, and, recognizing in this regard the full commitment to these elements expressed by the Mechanism, *urges* the Mechanism to continue to be guided in its activities by these elements;

6. *Welcomes* the report (S/2018/347) submitted by the Mechanism to the Council pursuant to its Presidential Statement (S/PRST/2018/6) for the purposes of the review of the progress of the work of the Mechanism, including in completing its functions, as required by paragraph 17 of resolution 1966 of 22 December 2010, and the report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) on the evaluation of the methods and work of the Mechanism (S/2018/206);

7. *Takes note* of the work of the Mechanism to date, in particular development of a legal and regulatory framework, procedures, and working practices consistent with the Statute of the Mechanism and drawing on lessons learned from and best practices of the ICTY and ICTR and of other tribunals, including its implementation of the double-hatting of personnel, use of rosters to ensure judges and staff are utilized only when required, enabling judges and staff to work remotely to the maximum extent possible, and minimizing the need for full bench participation in pre-trial and pre-appeal hearing work, in order to produce substantial reductions in the costs of judicial activities compared to those of the ICTY and ICTR, and commends the Mechanism for its efforts to produce such reductions;

8. *Notes* further the views and recommendations made with regard to the Mechanism's work by the Council's Informal Working Group on International Tribunals, as reflected in this resolution, and *requests* the Mechanism to take into account those views and implement the recommendations, and to continue to take steps, such as those referred to in paragraph 7, to further enhance efficiency and effective and transparent management, in particular: (i) full implementation of the outstanding recommendations of the OIOS; (ii) production of more focused projections of completion timelines and disciplined adherence thereto, including by making the best use of the diverse approaches of common law and civil law systems; (iii) enhancement of the geographic diversity and gender balance of staff, while ensuring continued professional expertise; (iv) implementation of a human resources

policy consistent with its temporary mandate; and (v) further reduction of costs, including through, but not limited to, flexible staff engagement;

9. *Reiterates* its request to the Mechanism to include in its six-monthly reports to the Council information on progress achieved in implementing this resolution, as well as detailed information on the staffing of the Mechanism, respective workload and related costs with breakdown by division and detailed projections of the duration of residual functions based on available data;

10. *Notes* the views and concerns expressed by some Member States during the Security Council debate on 6 June 2018 about the current approach of the Mechanism to early release of persons convicted by the ICTR, and encourages the Mechanism to consider an appropriate solution, including by considering putting in place conditions on early release in appropriate cases;

11. *Notes* the conclusion of the Council's review of the progress of the work of the Mechanism, including in completing its functions, since the last review of the Mechanism in December 2015, pursuant to resolution 1966 (2010);

12. *Recalls*, with a view to strengthening independent oversight of the Mechanism, that, as set out in its Presidential Statement of 19 March 2018 (S/PRST/2018/6), future reviews carried out pursuant to paragraph 17 of resolution 1966 (2010) shall include evaluation reports sought from the OIOS with respect to the methods and work of the Mechanism;

13. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

United Nations S/2018/629

Security Council

Distr.: General
25 June 2018
English
Original: Russian

Letter dated 22 June 2018 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith information bulletins from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic for 21 and 22 June 2018 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) D. **Polyanskiy**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

18-10407 (E) 270618 270618

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Annex to the letter dated 22 June 2018 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (21 June 2018)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

The Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported two incidents of gunfire in Ladhiqiyah Governorate.

The Turkish representative office has not reported any incidents of gunfire.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out one humanitarian operation in Bayt Saham, Rif Dimashq Governorate. Construction materials with a total weight of 30 tons were delivered to people in need.

In total, 1,841 humanitarian operations have been carried out.

The total weight of humanitarian cargo delivered is 2,654.16 tons.

Over the past 24 hours, medical assistance has been provided to 13 residents.

Medical assistance has been provided to residents.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

No ceasefire agreements have been signed over the past 24 hours.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process is unchanged — it is still 2,516.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 234.

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (22 June 2018)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

The Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported two incidents of gunfire: one in Ladhiqiyah Governorate and one in Aleppo Governorate.

The Turkish representative office has not reported any incidents of gunfire.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out two humanitarian operations: one in Shaykh Ahmad, Aleppo Governorate (650 food parcels with a total weight of 2.8 tons were delivered to people in need); and one in Marrat, Dayr al-Zawr Governorate (650 food parcels with a total weight of 2.8 tons were delivered to people in need).

In total, 1,843 humanitarian operations have been carried out.

The total weight of humanitarian cargo delivered is 2,689.76 tons.

Over the past 24 hours, medical assistance has been provided to 275 residents.

In total, medical assistance has been provided to 83,942 residents.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, one ceasefire agreement has been signed with Buwaydah al-Saghirah in Aleppo Governorate.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process has increased to 2,517.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 234.

United Nations S/2018/630

Security Council

Distr.: General
28 June 2018
English
Original: Arabic

Identical letters dated 22 June 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my country's Government, I should like to draw to your attention the following information on the destructive role being played by the United States, Britain, France, and certain States within those countries' orbits through their sponsorship and support for armed terrorist groups in Syria. They are providing terrorist groups with toxic chemicals, and assistance in transporting, storing and mixing chemicals with a view to using them against Syrian civilians and then blaming the Syrian Government.

The Syrian Arab Republic, which is a founding member of the United Nations, believes that the Organization can play a key role in finding solutions to crises when Member States adhere to the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, the most important of which is the maintenance of international peace and security, which is the main task entrusted to the Security Council.

Starting with the end of 2012 (see our identical letters dated 8 December 2012 (A/67/628-S/2012/917)), the Syrian Arab Republic has warned the international community time and again of the risk of the use by terrorist groups use of toxic chemicals as weapons. At that time, terrorist groups had taken control of a private-sector laboratory east of the city of Aleppo that contained tons of toxic chlorine. On 19 March 2013, armed terrorist groups made their first use of chemical weapons in Syria in the Khan al-Asal attack. A rocket launched by terrorist groups exploded, and 25 were killed and more than 110 injured from inhaling poison gas. The victims included civilians and military personnel, all of whom were taken to hospitals in the city of Aleppo. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic turned to the United Nations alone, very early on, for assistance in investigating that instance of chemical weapons use in that town. It requested the Secretary-General to send an urgent mission to help the Syrian Government investigate the use of toxic chemical weapons and identify the party that used them. Unfortunately, as a result of pressure exerted by influential Western States on the Security Council, the Secretary-General was not able to send the investigative team headed by Professor Sellström until four months after the Syrian Government had made its request. To date, that United Nations mission has still not visited the scene of that crime. That is because of the artificially fabricated Ghutah incident of 21 August 2013, which occurred just hours before Professor Sellström's mission was set to leave Damascus and head to Khan al-Asal. The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons has also not visited the aforementioned site.

In dozens of letters to the Security Council and the Secretary-General, the Syrian Arab Republic has conveyed significant intelligence on the possession by terrorists of toxic chemicals, and operations to transfer those chemicals into Syria from neighbouring States. The terrorists have also conducted laboratory tests on the use of chemical materials in Turkish territory.

The Syrian Arab Republic has also told the Council on more than one occasion that the United States, Saudi Arabia and other States are overseeing the transfer of toxic chemicals into Syrian territory. The United States and Israel have also trained terrorists in Turkey and other States in the mixing, preparation and use of toxic chemicals as weapons. The United States also sent two American chemical war specialists into Syria, where they trained members of the Nusrah Front organization and an affiliated group known as the Soldiers of al-Aqsa in how to mix and use chemicals. In its letter of 30 May 2017, the Syrian Arab Republic informed the Council of another incident on 23 May 2017, in which two American chemicals specialists, accompanied by two others from Kuwait, brought chemicals across the Turkish-Syrian border in the Allani area near the Friendship Dam. They headed to a factory that manufactures rockets and hell cannons in the eastern part of the town of Saraqib in the eastern Idlib countryside. The factory is eight metres underground and reinforced by cement, with a three-metre thick layer of earth on top of it, and contains large quantities of chemicals, sarin gas, and materials used in the manufacture of toxic rockets. In its letter of 29 September 2017, the Syrian Arab Republic informed the Council that on 20 August 2017, several American officers led by an individual known as "Fyul Kin" (designated "Ali al-Siddiq-Abu Ahmad" by the terrorist organization Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant) transported chemical substances in three refrigerated trucks from Suwaydan and Harabish, Dayr al-Zawr governorate, to the Izzawi area south of Shaddadah, and then on to the Live Stone resort in Hasakah governorate. On 22 August 2017, the substances were transferred to the Jabal Karatshuk site in the Malikiyah area and from there to the American forces' airbase at Rumaylan. Several American chemical specialists, led by the specialist "Grund", also came in with the substances.

In identical letters dated 17 March 2014 (S/2014/195), the Syrian Arab Republic informed the Council that an individual named Haytham Salahuddin Qassab transported chemical substances from Turkey on behalf of the terrorist organization known as Ahrar al-Sham. He obtained those substances from the Dharwa Import and Export Company, located in Bolha Çeylioğlu, near the post office on the road to Kozan. The terrorist Haytham Qassab requested several substances, including, inter alia, white phosphorous, red phosphorous, potassium fluoride, methanol, isopropyl hydroxylamyl and resorcinol, allegedly to be used to produce white smoke in certain areas and then claim that Syrian planes had bombarded them. However, the primary reason for requesting those substances was to use them as chemical weapons.

In its letter of 4 February 2016, the Syrian Arab Republic informed the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism about the so-called "sarin cell". The Turkish authorities had arrested Nuhad Qassab, a holder of dual Syrian and Turkish nationality, during an attempt to smuggle sarin from Turkey into Syria. He admitted that Saudi Arabian and Turkish intelligence had asked him to transport sarin gas from Libya to Turkey. He then attempted to transport the sarin gas from Turkey through Iskandarun province into Syria in barrels packed with acid. He also admitted that he had been working with seven other people, including a Turkish intelligence agent named Mirsal Yilmaz.

What has been going on and continues to go on today is a cheap policy whereby the United States makes use of terrorist groups. It provides them with toxic chemicals and trains their members in how to prepare and use those chemicals as weapons. It then trains and prepares terrorist groups such as the so-called White Helmets and

civilians in areas controlled by terrorist groups to organize and film staged chemical attacks. Then the United States, along with Britain and France, directs the Joint Investigative Mechanism to prepare distorted reports blaming the Syrian Government. We stress that those distorted reports prepared by the Joint Investigative Mechanism contain not a shred of evidence of use by the Syrian State of chemical weapons. Moreover, the United States did not even bother to wait for the fact-finding mission or Joint Investigative Mechanism to issue any reports before launching its attack against the Shu'ayrat military base in April 2017. Subsequently, on 7 April 2017, the armed terrorist groups staged another spectacle in Duma, again at the behest of their handlers in the West, and in particular Britain and the United States. The authenticity of that staged chemical attack has been refuted by eyewitnesses who actually appear in the very video clips of that alleged incident made by members of the terrorist "White Helmets" affiliated with the Nusrah Front. Subsequently, on 14 April 2018, the United States, France and Britain launched another attack on Syria. That is the way the United States and States within its orbit — including France, Britain, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar — operate. Their policy is to have terrorist groups that work with them, such as Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), the Nusrah Front, and other affiliated terrorist groups stage these spectacles, so that they can launch attacks against Syria just prior to any important meeting at the Security Council or in The Hague.

In our letter of 29 May 2018, we recently informed the Council, that the terrorist Mish'al Idris al-Hamash, a former operative of the ISIL terrorist organization who currently works with United States forces and the so-called Syrian Democratic Forces in the Jadid Ukaydat area, has been taking families from the area under the control of the Syrian Democratic Forces in the Dayr al-Zawr countryside to the United States base at the Jafrah oilfield. They have been drilled in staging a theatrical performance to make it look as though the armed forces of the Syrian Arab Republic bombarded them using shells armed with chemical substances. The training of those families began on 21 May 2018. The United States and Kurdish forces at the base plan to provoke our forces that are in position around the oilfield. It is believed that the production will be staged in one of the villages outside the oilfield.

In our letter of 29 May 2018, we informed the Council that armed terrorist groups located in the rural areas of Idlib and northern Hama were preparing to stage a fake chemical attack. Preparations and training were taking place on Turkish territory in the presence of officers from United States and other Western intelligence services, film producers, personnel from the organization Doctors without Borders (in order to avoid the mistakes that marred previous theatrics), and individuals who were brought over from Syrian refugee camps. Their aim was to blame the Syrian Arab Army and influence global public opinion.

The Syrian Arab Army and Syrian civilians have been targeted with toxic chemicals and chemical weapons, including chlorine gas, by armed terrorist groups, such as ISIL, the Nusrah Front and associated entities, in many parts of Syria. That is part of the overall pattern of criminal and terrorist acts being perpetrated by those organizations in Syria and the region. To date, we have sent the Security Council and its specialized committees more than 146 letters, with details about the possession, production and use of toxic chemicals by armed terrorist groups. Unfortunately, the Syrian Government has not received a single word in response about any action taken by the Council against the States that have facilitated the acquisition and use of toxic chemicals by those groups.

After these 146 letters in which we have provided the Security Council with details on the acquisition, manufacture and use of toxic chemicals by armed terrorist groups, as well as information on the coordinates of storage sites and the recently disclosed existence of laboratories and chemicals in the possession and under the

management of terrorist groups in Duma, Homs and Dayr al-Zawr, we are obliged to ask ourselves certain questions.

When will the Security Council investigate the information contained in the hundreds of letters we have sent it about the support, financing and weapons that have been provided and continued to be provided by the Governments of the United States, France, Britain, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey and Israel to armed terrorist groups in my country, and those countries' provision to those groups of toxic chemicals?

The Syrian Arab Republic believes that after convening hundreds of meetings on the implementation of resolutions on weapons of mass destruction and combating terrorism, the time has come for the Security Council to carry out its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security with integrity and balance. We must ask ourselves, yet again, when the Security Council will carry out its responsibility to hold those States accountable for their role in supplying terrorist groups with toxic chemicals, expertise and training, and in overseeing the transfer of those chemicals from abroad into Syria and from one place to another within Syrian territory. What those States are doing is a violation of agreements regulating the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and in particular the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction; Security Council resolution 1540 (2004); and resolutions on counter-terrorism. It also undermines international peace and security.

The Syrian Arab Republic reaffirms that it is in compliance with the letter and the spirit of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Since it acceded to the Convention in 2013, it no longer possesses any banned toxic chemical substances, as confirmed before the Security Council in September 2014 by Sigrid Kaag, Head of the Joint Mission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the United Nations for the Elimination of the Chemical Weapons Programme of the Syrian Arab Republic. Syria considers the use of chemical weapons to be an immoral act that must be condemned, regardless of where, when and under what conditions they are used.

The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic has conveyed and will continue to convey to you this important information on plans by terrorist groups to attack civilians in certain areas of Syria with chemical weapons and then blame of the Syrian Government. It expects the Council to take all the serious and urgent measures required by Security Council resolutions on counter-terrorism, including immediate measures against the States that support, sponsor and finance those armed terrorist groups.

I should be grateful if this letter could be issued as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations A/72/902–S/2018/631

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
26 June 2018

Original: English

General Assembly
Seventy-second session
Agenda items 35 and 40

Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan

Security Council
Seventy-third year

Letter dated 20 June 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to convey herewith the records of violations of the ceasefire by the Republic of Armenia in May 2018 (see annex).*

During the reporting period, the armed forces of Armenia violated the ceasefire regime 2,883 times and continued to use large-calibre guns and heavy weaponry from their positions in the occupied territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan and from the territory of the Republic of Armenia.

The military occupation by the armed forces of Armenia of the territories of Azerbaijan is the result of the explicitly annexationist agenda of Armenia and the major obstacle to achieving peace, security, stability and socioeconomic development in the region.

The sooner Armenia withdraws its armed forces from the Nagorno-Karabakh region and other occupied territories of Azerbaijan, the earlier the conflict will be resolved and both countries and their peoples will benefit from the prospects of cooperation and economic development.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 35 and 40, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Yashar **Aliyev**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

* The annex is being circulated in the language of submission only.

18-10514 (E) 100718

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 20 June 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia for May 2018*

Dates	*Direction (locality)*	*Weapons used*	*Number of ceasefire violations*	*Casualties and damages*
1–31 May	**Aghdam district, Azerbaijan**			
	Afatly village	AK	2	
	Ahmadali village	AK	13	
	Ahmadaghali village	AK/AKM	27	
	Ayag Garvand village	AK	20	
	Bash Garvand village	AK/AKM/DShK	38	
	Chamanly village	AK	44	
	Chiragly village	AK	39	
	Evoghlu village	AK	5	
	Garadaghli village	AK	8	
	Mahrizli village	AK/AKM/DShK/OSV	20	
	Mammadbaghirly village	AK	13	
	Mirashilly village	AK/AKM/DShK	24	
	Opposite positions	AK/AKM/DShK	83	
	Orta Garvand	AK/AKM/DShK	24	
	Saryjaly village	AK	10	
	Shahvalilar village	AKM	5	
	Yuzbashily village	AK	8	
	Zangishaly village	AK/AKM	16	
	Aghjabadi district, Azerbaijan			
	Gyamaddynly village	AK/AKM	119	
	Minakhorlu village	AK/AKM	42	
	Dashkasan district, Azerbaijan			
	Tazakand village	AKM	8	
	Zivilyan village	AKM	3	
	Fizuli district, Azerbaijan			
	Alkhanli village	AK	39	
	Ashaghi Abdurrahmanli village	AK/AKM	98	
	Horadiz village	AK/AKM	67	
	Opposite positions	AK/AKM	406	
	Shukurbayli village	AK/AKM	37	
	Gazakh district, Azerbaijan			
	Ashaghi Askipara village	AK/AKM	12	
	Bala Jafarli village	AK/AKM	32	
	Dashsalahli village	AKM	1	

* Settlements of the Republic of Azerbaijan included in this information are under occupation by the Republic of Armenia or situated close to the fire point areas.

Dates	*Direction (locality)*	*Weapons used*	*Number of ceasefire violations*	*Casualties and damages*
	Farahli village	AKM	2	
	Jafarli village	AKM	5	
	Gaymagly village	AK/AKM/DShK/NSV	38	
	Gushchu Ayrim village	AKM/DShK	48	
	Gyzylhajili village	AK/AKM	41	
	Kamarli village	AK/AKM	10	
	Kohna Gyshlag village	AKM	9	
	Mazam village	AKM	3	
	Musakoy village	AK/AKM	18	
	Unnamed heights	AKM	6	
	Gedebey district, Azerbaijan			
	Ayridara village	AKM	4	
	Ayrivang village	AKM	1	
	Daryurd village	AKM	1	
	Galakand village	AKM/DShK	12	
	Garavallar village	AKM	1	
	Gasimaghali village	AKM	3	
	Goyali village	AK/AKM/DShK	14	
	Mutudara village	AK/AKM/DShK/NSV	54	
	Novoivanovka village	AK/AKM	5	
	Unnamed heights	AKM	7	
	Zamanly village	AKM	22	
	Goranboy district, Azerbaijan			
	Balligaya village	AKM	3	
	Bash Gishlag village	AKM/DShK	13	
	Gargujag village	AK/AKM/OSV	18	
	Gulustan village	AK/AKM/DShK/OSV	53	
	Kharkhaput village	AK/AKM/DShK/OSV	25	
	Opposite positions	AK/AKM	31	
	Tapgaragoyunlu village	AK/AKM	92	
	Unnamed heights	AK/AKM/DShK	13	
	Unnamed positions	AK/AKM/DShK	53	
	Yenikand village	AKM/DShK	29	
	Yukhari Agiakend village	AKM	9	
	Zeyva village	AK/AKM	18	
	Goygol district, Azerbaijan			
	Kurdalylar village	AKM/DShK	16	
	Jabrayil district, Azerbaijan			
	Ahmadalilar village	AK	4	
	Jojug Marjanli village	AK/AKM	64	
	Lala Ilahi heights	AK/AKM	76	
	Khojavand district, Azerbaijan			
	Opposite positions	AK/AKM	214	

Dates	*Direction (locality)*	*Weapons used*	*Number of ceasefire violations*	*Casualties and damages*
	Unnamed heights	AK	13	
	Tartar district, Azerbaijan			
	Borsunlu village	AK/AKM	32	
	Chayly village	AK/AKM	57	
	Damirchilar village	AK	7	
	Gapanli village	AK/AKM	56	
	Gazyan village	AK/AKM	65	
	Girmizikand village	AKM	3	
	Hasangaya village	AK/AKM/DShK	95	
	Husanli village	AK	2	
	Jamilly village	AK	4	
	Karmiravan village	AK/AKM	10	
	Namirli village	AKM	6	
	Opposite positions	AK/AKM/DShK	132	
	Tazakand village	AK/AKM	42	
	Tovuz district, Azerbaijan			
	Aghdam village	AKM	22	
	Aghbulag village	AKM	6	
	Alibayli village	AKM	2	
	Garalar village	AKM	8	
	Goshakand village	AKM	2	
	Kokhanaby village	AK/AKM	3	
	Munjuglu village	AK/AKM/DShK	11	
	Unnamed heights	AKM	7	

Abbreviations: AK, Kalashnikov assault rifle; AKM, modernized Kalashnikov assault rifle; DShK, heavy machine gun; NSV, 12.7-mm calibre heavy machine gun; OSV, semi-automatic sniper rifle.

United Nations S/2018/632

Security Council

Distr.: General
25 June 2018

Original: English

Letter dated 25 June 2018 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General

In my capacity as President of the Security Council, I am forwarding to you a letter dated 18 June 2018 from the Chair of the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict established under Security Council resolution 1612 (2005), based on the Working Group's conclusions adopted on 4 May 2018 (S/AC.51/2018/1/Rev.1) (see annex).

(*Signed*) Vassily **Nebenzia**
President of the Security Council

18-10408 (E) 270618

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Annex

Letter dated 18 June 2018 from the Chair of the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict addressed to the Secretary-General

At its 70th formal meeting, on 12 March 2018, the Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict examined the second report of the Secretary-General on children and armed conflict in Mali (S/2018/136), covering the period from January 2014 to June 2017. At its 71st meeting, on 4 May 2018, the Working Group adopted its conclusions on children and armed conflict in Mali (S/AC.51/2018/1/Rev.1).

In follow-up to the recommendations of the Working Group and subject to and consistent with applicable international law and relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolutions 1612 (2005), 1882 (2009), 1998 (2011), 2068 (2012), 2143 (2014) and 2225 (2015), I am entrusted, in my capacity as Chair of the Working Group, with:

(a) Requesting you to continue to ensure the effectiveness of the monitoring and reporting mechanism on children and armed conflict in Mali and to maintain the child protection component of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), including through the deployment of child protection advisers throughout MINUSMA areas of operation, and noting that their key tasks include, among others, monitoring and reporting on violations and abuses committed against children, mainstreaming child protection within the Mission, training the Mission personnel and engaging in dialogue on action plans;

(b) Also requesting you to ensure that MINUSMA and the United Nations Children's Fund strengthen their efforts to further support, in line with their respective mandates, the Malian authorities in mainstreaming the specific needs of children affected by the armed conflict and the protection of their rights in all disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes and security sector reform, in establishing a joint mechanism for the review of cases of children detained on charges related to the armed conflict and association with armed groups, in conducting a screening and age assessment of the Malian defence and security forces and in establishing recruitment procedures and age assessment measures to prevent underage recruitment;

(c) Further requesting you to ensure that the United Nations country task force on monitoring and reporting continues its advocacy for the release and reintegration of children associated with armed groups and forces and children detained on charges related to association with armed groups and prioritizes its efforts to reach out to non-State armed groups, with a view to developing action plans to end the recruitment and use of children in violation of applicable international law, as well as rape and sexual violence, and to address other violations and abuses committed against children in Mali.

(*Signed*) Olof **Skoog**
Chair
Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict

United Nations S/2018/633

Security Council

Distr.: General
27 June 2018
English
Original: Russian

Letter dated 25 June 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith information bulletins from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic for the period from 23 to 25 June 2018 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) V. **Nebenzia**

18-10585 (E) 280618 020718

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Annex to the letter dated 25 June 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (23 June 2018)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

The Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported seven incidents of gunfire in the following Governorates: four in Ladhiqiyah, two in Aleppo and one in Hama.

The Turkish representative office has not reported any incidents of gunfire.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

The Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has not carried out any humanitarian operations over the past 24 hours.

In total, 1,843 humanitarian operations have been carried out.

The total weight of humanitarian cargo delivered is 2,689.76 tons.

Over the past 24 hours, medical assistance has been provided to 16 residents.

In total, medical assistance has been provided to 83,958 residents.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

Over the past 24 hours, one ceasefire agreement has been signed with Hasakah in Hasakah Governorate.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process is 2,518.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 234.

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (24 June 2018)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

The Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported two incidents of gunfire: one in Aleppo Governorate and one in Ladhiqiyah Governorate.

The Turkish representative office has not reported any incidents of gunfire.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

The Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has not carried out any humanitarian operations over the past 24 hours.

In total, 1,843 humanitarian operations have been carried out.

The total weight of humanitarian cargo delivered is 2,689.76 tons.

Over the past 24 hours, medical assistance has been provided to 194 residents.

In total, medical assistance has been provided to 84,152 residents.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

No ceasefire agreements have been signed over the past 24 hours.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process is 2,518.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 234.

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (25 June 2018)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

The Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported three incidents of gunfire: two in Aleppo Governorate and one in Ladhiqiyah Governorate.

The Turkish representative office has not reported any incidents of gunfire.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

The Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out one humanitarian operation over the past 24 hours in Umm al-Tuyur, Hama Governorate: 650 food parcels with a total weight of 2.8 tons were delivered to people in need.

In total, 1,844 humanitarian operations have been carried out.

The total weight of humanitarian cargo delivered is 2,692.56 tons.

Over the past 24 hours, medical assistance has been provided to 315 residents.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

No ceasefire agreements have been signed over the past 24 hours.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process is unchanged — it is still 2,518.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 234.

United Nations S/2018/634*

Security Council

Distr.: General
26 June 2018

Original: English

Letter dated 26 June 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Upon instructions from my Government, I wish to bring to your attention the views of the Islamic Republic of Iran on the fifth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), contained in document S/2018/602, as follows:

(a) The statement of the Islamic Republic of Iran following the adoption of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), which is reflected in the annex to document S/2015/550, and the positions contained therein, especially paragraphs 5, 6, 8 and 11, are hereby reiterated;

(b) Since the issuance of the fourth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council 2231 (2015) (S/2017/1030), on 8 December 2017, the most blatant material breach of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and brazen non-compliance with Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) has occurred as a result of the unilateral and unlawful decision of the President of the United States on 8 May 2018 "to cease the participation of the United States in the JCPOA" and "to reimpose all United States sanctions lifted or waived in connection with the JCPOA". The dimensions and consequences of such grave non-compliance with Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) deserved to be adequately elaborated in the fifth report of the Secretary-General; however, the report falls short of doing so. At the minimum, the report should have noted the concerns expressed by the overwhelming majority of Member States regarding the grave implications of the unilateral and irresponsible conduct of the United States towards the JCPOA for the rule of law, multilateralism, nuclear non-proliferation and the very foundation of diplomacy;

(c) While in the report the Secretary-General "deeply regrets" the recent United States action as a "setback to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action" and recognizes that the Plan "has contributed to regional and international peace and security", concrete measures in support of the continued implementation of the JCPOA could have been recommended, including calling upon the Security Council to take urgent action to condemn the United States and hold it accountable for the consequences of this reckless and wrongful act that flagrantly violated Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), the international law and the Charter of the United Nations. Providing such a recommendation is fully in line with paragraph 2 of resolution 2231 (2015), in which the Council "calls upon all ... international organizations to take such actions as may be appropriate to support the implementation of the JCPOA";

* Reissued for technical reasons on 10 July 2018.

18-10497* (E) 100718

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(d) The report correctly points out that "the Plan, which was unanimously endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution 2231 (2015), laid out reciprocal commitments" and that the recent violation of the JCPOA by the United States occurred in the face of "continued adherence by the Islamic Republic of Iran to its nuclear-related commitments". In his letter regarding the United States' latest violation of the JCPOA (A/72/869-S/2018/453), the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, M. Javad Zarif, illustrated that the prolonged and multiple cases of significant non-performance of the JCPOA by the United States over the last three years, culminating in its unlawful withdrawal from the JCPOA and reimposition of unilateral sanctions, have caused irreparable harm to Iran and its international business relations. In this context, there shall be no doubt that if, after the exhaustion of available remedies, the rights and benefits of the Islamic Republic of Iran are not fully compensated, it is Iran's unquestionable right — recognized also under the JCPOA and Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) — to take appropriate actions and to treat the reimposition of nuclear-related sanctions by the United States 'as grounds to cease performing its commitments under [the] JCPOA in whole or in part";

(e) The JCPOA Joint Commission meeting on 25 May 2018, which was briefly referred to in the report, was convened upon the request of the Islamic Republic of Iran in order to review the implications of the withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA and discuss the way forward to ensure the continued implementation of the deal in all its aspects. As reflected in the statement issued following the meeting (see annex), participants "recognized that the lifting of nuclear-related sanctions allowing for the normalization of trade and economic relations with Iran constitute essential parts of the JCPOA", "reviewed the potential impact of the reimposition of US sanctions following a meeting of the Working Group on the Implementation of Sanctions Lifting" and "discussed common efforts with a view to practical solutions concerning the following issues within the next few weeks: maintaining and deepening economic relations with Iran; the continued sale of Iran's oil and gas condensate, petroleum products and petrochemicals and related transfers; effective banking transactions with Iran; continued sea, land, air and rail transportation relations with Iran; the further provision of export credit and development of special purpose vehicles in financial banking, insurance and trade areas, with the aim of facilitating economic and financial cooperation, including by offering practical support for trade and investment ...";

(f) As elaborated in my letters dated 17 July 2016 (S/2016/626), 18 January 2017 (S/2017/51), 29 June 2017 (S/2017/560) and 19 December 2017 (S/2017/1075), any report on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) without the necessary information on the implementation of its annex A and the commitments of all participants of the JCPOA fails to furnish a complete picture to the members of the Council, as well as the international community, about the implementation of the resolution. Thus, we continue to urge the Secretariat to respect the scope of its reporting mandate, contained in paragraph 7 of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2016/44);

(g) United States actions and omissions defy Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) and its annex B. The Security Council, in its resolution, emphasizes that "the JCPOA is conducive to promoting and facilitating the development of normal economic and trade contacts and cooperation with the Islamic Republic of Iran", "urges its full implementation on the timetable established in the JCPOA" and "calls upon all Member States ... to support the implementation of the JCPOA, including by taking actions commensurate with the implementation plan set out in the JCPOA and the present resolution and by refraining from actions that undermine implementation of commitments under the JCPOA". Many actions of the United

States and some of its regional allies defy, inter alia, these provisions. The United States has also rendered the case-by-case authorization mechanism elaborated in paragraphs 4 to 6 of annex B useless in such a way that not a single case has been considered by the Council so far. Some concrete examples of their behaviour in violation of annex B were illustrated in my letter dated 28 August 2017 (S/2017/739). My Government urges the Security Council and the Secretary-General to consider concrete guarantees to ensure effective and functional implementation of the "case by case" authorization mechanism set forth in paragraphs 4 to 6 of annex B. Otherwise, implementation of the said provisions by Member States would no longer have logical merit;

(h) Paragraphs 10, 12, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 38, 39 and 40 of the report concern the Secretariat's continued engagement in the examination of information and verification trips regarding alleged actions. These activities continue to take place without even prior notification to, let alone seeking authorization of, the Security Council, contrary to paragraphs 6 and 10 of the note by the President of the Security Council (S/2016/44). As a result of the Secretariat's deviation from its mandate, its findings or observations emanating from such extralegal activities lack credibility and legitimacy;

(i) The report of the Secretary-General shall be based upon authenticated information from reliable and credible sources. However, paragraphs 11, 13, 14, 30, 34, 42, 43 and 47 of the report suggest that the Secretariat extracted allegations from unreliable media sources and, in some instances, such as in paragraph 43, even interpreted them in a biased manner. While under paragraph 2 of resolution 2231 (2015), the Secretariat itself is under the obligation to refrain "from actions that undermine implementation of commitments under the JCPOA", unfortunately, its insistence on this unacceptable practice provided a platform for giving credit to unfounded allegations against Iran and undermining the JCPOA and its implementation;

(j) The report contains a number of allegations, misinformation and unnecessary details, such as those in paragraphs 11, 12, 13, 22, 24, 26, 31, 34, 36, 38, 39, 40 and 43, which have, in whole or in part, already been proved baseless. We believe that these flaws and shortcomings shed doubts on the integrity and credibility of the report;

(k) Information contained in paragraphs 44 and 47, regardless of their authenticity, does not concern activities subject to annex B and its paragraph 6. In future, the Secretariat should refrain from including such information in its reports;

(l) Most of the information in paragraphs 10 and 25 to 32 has already been addressed in my letter dated 21 February 2018 (S/2018/145). There is no reliable information regarding the speculation presented in paragraph 30 over a specific missile, and it is worthy of note that evidence projected by the violations of international law has no probative value. Claims with regard to such attribution, including similarities between logos found on components and trademarks belonging to certain companies in Iran, are inaccurate and flawed;

(m) Most allegations in the report, like previous ones, are presented by Israel, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, which have a record of non-compliance with Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), including its paragraph 2. Those who favoured the United States withdrawal from the JCPOA made every effort to prevent its conclusion and then tried to undermine its implementation, including by the killing of Iranian nuclear scientists, making preposterous shows and exerting pressure, shall not be considered reliable sources of information with good faith. Regrettably, the current practice of the Secretariat has led to the proliferation of allegations by the same countries. It is expected that the Secretariat would pay

attention to the positions and measures of the aforesaid countries taken against the JCPOA and remind them of their explicit obligations under Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) "to support the implementation of the JCPOA, including by taking actions commensurate with the implementation plan set out in the JCPOA and the present resolution and by refraining from actions that undermine implementation of commitments under the JCPOA";

(n) The Islamic Republic of Iran is determined to actively contribute to the promotion of peace and stability in the region in the face of the increasing threat of terrorism and extremism, consistent with its international commitments. In this regard, Iran stands ready to fully cooperate with its neighbours and the international community in dealing with this common global threat.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Gholamali **Khoshroo**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex to the letter dated 26 June 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Chair's statement following the 25 May 2018 meeting of the Joint Commission of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

A meeting of the Joint Commission of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) took place in Vienna on 25 May 2018 upon the request of the Islamic Republic of Iran in order to review the implications of the withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA and discuss the way forward to ensure the continued implementation of the deal in all its aspects.

Under the terms of the JCPOA, the Joint Commission is responsible for overseeing the implementation of the nuclear deal.

The Joint Commission was chaired, on behalf of EU High Representative Federica Mogherini, by EEAS Secretary-General Helga Schmid and, following the withdrawal of the United States of America from the JCPOA, was attended by the E3+2 (China, France, Germany, Russia, United Kingdom) and Iran at the level of Political Directors/Deputy Foreign Ministers.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)'s Director General Amano was present at the beginning of the Joint Commission against the background of the 11th report by the IAEA which had just been issued. The participants welcomed the fact that the IAEA has again confirmed the continued adherence by Iran to its nuclear-related commitments. They also commended the professional and impartial role played by the IAEA, the only body charged with the monitoring and verification of the implementation by Iran of its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA and UN Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015).

Participants regretted the withdrawal of the United States from the nuclear deal and the announced re-imposition of US sanctions lifted under the JCPOA. The JCPOA is a key element of the global non-proliferation architecture and a significant diplomatic achievement endorsed unanimously by the UN Security Council in its Resolution 2231.

The Joint Commission meeting provided the opportunity to address the unilateral withdrawal of the United States and its consequences, to discuss the way forward, and the continued implementation of the JCPOA with regard to nuclear and sanctions lifting-related commitments as well as Procurement Channel matters and civil nuclear cooperation.

Participants recalled their commitment to the continued, full and effective implementation of the JCPOA in good faith and in a constructive atmosphere and recognised that the lifting of nuclear-related sanctions allowing for the normalisation of trade and economic relations with Iran constitute essential parts of the JCPOA.

Participants reviewed the potential impact of the re-imposition of US sanctions following a meeting of the Working Group on the Implementation of Sanctions-Lifting, which was convened the day before.

In this regard, participants discussed common efforts with a view to practical solutions concerning the following issues within the next few weeks: maintaining and deepening economic relations with Iran; the continued sale of Iran's oil and gas condensate petroleum products and petrochemicals and related transfers; effective banking transactions with Iran; continued sea, land, air and rail transportation

relations with Iran; the further provision of export credit and development of special purpose vehicles in financial banking, insurance and trade areas with the aim of facilitating economic and financial cooperation, including by offering practical support for trade and investment; the further development and implementation of Memoranda of Understanding and contracts between third-countries companies and Iranian counterparts; further investments in Iran; the protection of economic operators and ensuring legal certainty; the further development of a transparent, rules-based business environment in Iran.

These efforts are aimed at preserving the interests of businesses and investors engaged with Iran. Participants noted that economic operators pursuing legitimate business with Iran were acting in good faith based on commitments contained in the JCPOA and endorsed at the highest level unanimously by a UN Security Council Resolution.

Participants stressed their commitment to work to ensure that these benefits would continue to be delivered and agreed to this end to deepen their dialogue at all levels, including at the level of experts with a view to finding practical solutions to these problems.

Participants agreed to intensify their ongoing work in the Joint Commission and all its bodies in the format of E3/EU+2 and Iran, in particular the Working Group on the Implementation of Sanctions-Lifting.

As a next step, Iran proposed a Ministerial meeting of the Joint Commission.

United Nations S/2018/635

Security Council

Distr.: General
26 June 2018

Original: English

Letter dated 26 June 2018 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Libya to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a statement dated 26 June 2018 by the Presidency Council of the Government of National Accord of Libya on the illegitimate measures to hand over oil facilities in Libya (see annex).

I request that the present letter and its annex be published as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Elmahdi S. **Elmajerbi**
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

18-10507 (E) 280618 280618

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Annex to the letter dated 26 June 2018 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Libya to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

[Original: Arabic]

Statement of the Presidency Council regarding illegal measures taken with respect to the handover of oil facilities

The Presidency Council of the Government of National Accord affirms that the declaration by certain unauthorized parties regarding the handover of oil ports to an illegitimate and unrecognized entity is a clear infringement on the authorities and competences of the National Oil Corporation, which is the sole body authorized to manage oil ports and facilities.

Such actions will exacerbate tensions and strains, are not conducive to consensus, and will not in any way lead in a conciliatory direction. On the contrary, they will serve to pave the way to factionalism and division, and undermine all international and local efforts that have been made over the years to achieve stability. This recent measure is no different from other events witnessed by the oil crescent region in recent times that have led to the squandering of Libyans' resources.

The Presidential Council reaffirms the established fact that the National Oil Corporation, currently headquartered in Tripoli, is the sole legal entity responsible for the management of oil in accordance with mechanisms and laws in force. Proceeds from the sale of oil are transferred to the Central Bank of Libya to provide for the needs of all Libyans, to be spent on the resolution of crises and administration of the country's affairs in all regions without any discrimination. The measure in question is an irresponsible act and poses a direct and dangerous threat to the interests and resources of the Libyan people. It entails obligations on the part of the Libyan State towards international parties and global oil corporations, and does substantial damage to the reputation of Libya.

The Presidential Council has acted with responsibility and wisdom to keep oil out of the political and military conflict. It has not allowed itself to be dragged in despite repeated provocation and escalation. It has instead done everything possible to enable the rehabilitation of oil facilities, which has allowed for a resumption and gradual increase in exports under the supervision of the National Oil Corporation within international quotas.

In the light of the above, we call on the Security Council and the sanctions committee to track and interdict any illegal sales that might result from these acts, in accordance with the relevant international resolutions, and in particular Security Council resolution 2362 (2017), which condemns all illegal attempts to dispose of Libyan oil in any way by parallel institutions which are not acting under the authority of the Government of National Accord. We warn all those involved in taking this measure of its repercussions. We call on them to retract it immediately and nullify any consequences stemming from it. We stress that the Presidency Council will exercise all its authorities and powers to take domestic and international legal measures to prosecute those involved no matter what their positions or motives.

The Presidency Council of the Government of National Accord

United Nations S/2018/636

Security Council

Distr.: General
26 June 2018

Original: English

Letter dated 26 June 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Upon instructions from my Government, I am writing again with regard to the continued military hostilities committed by Iranian-backed Houthi militias in a flagrant violation of the security and safety of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Charter of the United Nations, rules and principles of international law and the relevant Security Council resolutions.

On 24 June 2018, at 2039 hours, Royal Saudi Air Defence forces detected the launch of two ballistic missiles by the Iranian-backed Houthi militia from Sa'dah Governorate in Yemen aimed at the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The two missiles were launched deliberately to target densely populated areas in Riyadh. The Royal Saudi Air Defence forces succeeded in intercepting the missiles and destroyed them, resulting in fragments falling throughout some residential areas; no damage was caused.

Iran's supply of ballistic missiles to the Houthi rebel militia is widely evident and continues to pose serious regional and global threats, as has been reflected in the fifth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), dated 12 June 2018 (S/2018/602). We call upon the Council to shoulder its responsibility, and we insist on the full and immediate implementation of its resolutions 2216 (2015) and 2231 (2015). The Council must condemn, in clear and unambiguous language, Iran for supporting the Houthi rebel militias in their terrorist crimes, where the support is clearly visible by providing the militias with weapons and missiles in violation of resolutions 2216 (2015) and 2231 (2015).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter distributed as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Abdallah Y. **Al-Mouallimi**
Permanent Representative

18-10515 (E) 280618

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United Nations S/2018/637

Security Council

Distr.: General
28 June 2018
English
Original: Arabic

Identical letters dated 26 June 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I should like to convey to you the position of the Syrian Arab Republic regarding the fifty-second report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016) and 2393 (2017) (S/2018/619).

The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic regrets that the authors of the reports of the Secretary-General and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) continue to take a politicized and negative approach to the Syrian Arab Republic and its institutions. Moreover, the Government deplores the fact that, in the report under consideration, the authors continued to ignore its concerns and the questions that it posed to the relevant Secretariat officials and the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs in its response to the fifty-first report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolutions 2139 (2014), 2165 (2014), 2191 (2014), 2258 (2015), 2332 (2016) and 2393 (2017) (S/2018/484).

The negative approach adopted by Secretariat officials and OCHA has increased the conviction of the Government that United Nations humanitarian affairs officials are incapable of answering those logical and objective questions. In fact, they are incapable changing or improving their approach, which does not contribute, in any manner or form, to strengthening the humanitarian response in Syria. Their approach is solely aimed at serving the interests of certain Western States, and their proxies in the region, that are hostile to Syria and are influential within the Security Council.

Following is a brief overview of the position of the Syrian Government with respect to the humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic and the report under consideration:

Improving the living conditions and ensuring the security and safety of Syrians are the highest national priorities of the Syrian Government. Those priorities are in keeping with its constitutional mandate and its commitment to national law, the principles of international humanitarian law and United Nations resolutions concerning humanitarian affairs. In order to achieve that goal and ensure decent living conditions for and provide basic services to Syrians, the Government provides every form of support, and far in excess of the amount provided by any other party, including the United Nations. The Government does so despite all the difficulties and challenges that the Syrian State and its institutions face as a result of terrorism, the

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practices of States that support terrorism, the crimes committed by the international coalition and the illegal unilateral, coercive measures that are being imposed on Syria by several States and entities, such as the United States of America and the European Union.

The report under consideration is supposed to focus on the humanitarian situation in the Syrian Arab Republic, rather than on developments in the quest for a political settlement. The Syrian Government reiterates that it rejects the lack of distinction between mandates and the introduction of political issues into a report on the humanitarian situation, a report that the authors of which are supposed to ensure is not politicized in any way.

It has now become imperative to hold the authors accountable for contravening the resolutions of the Security Council on counter-terrorism and for using the term "armed opposition in Idlib" to refer to the Nusrah Front or the Levant Liberation Organization and their affiliated and associated groups, which have been listed as terrorist entities by the Security Council.

It is unacceptable for the authors to be so blatantly politicized in their approach, as demonstrated by the fact that they hold the Syrian Government responsible for the failure to deliver humanitarian assistance, yet they ignore the real obstacles to the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Syria, including, in particular, the lackadaisical manner in which OCHA representatives in Damascus have gone about their responsibilities in Syria, their refusal to move into liberated areas and areas that have concluded reconciliation agreements, and the extreme selectivity that they have demonstrated in carrying out their work and distributing assistance, functions that are meant to carried out in a humanitarian and non-discriminatory manner. Another significant obstacle is the shortfall in funding. To date, only 30 per cent of the funding required is available. Meanwhile, some donors have tied their funding to political requirements that are contrary to the principles of humanitarian work and have refused to support the rehabilitation of Syrian service facilities, which could make it possible for refugees and internally displaced persons to return to their homes in dignity and safety. Other obstacles include the theft of humanitarian aid by terrorist groups, which have complicated the delivery of aid to civilian beneficiaries, and the inability to secure supplies for humanitarian relief operations because of the economic measures that Europe and the United States of America have taken against the Syrian people.

The Syrian Government pays no heed to any descriptions or terms to which it has not agreed, particularly given that, in the past, those terms have been used solely for political purposes and exploitation; they have never been used in a constructive manner to support the Syrian people.

The greatest obstacle to humanitarian work continues to be the conduct of States that are hostile to Syria, their ongoing support for terrorism and their efforts to prolong the crisis and impede efforts to resolve it and restore security and stability. The most recent example of that conduct was the decision of the United States of America to provide $6.6 million in additional support to the "White Helmets" terrorist organization, the principal arm of the Nusrah Front terrorist organization, with a view to having the former carry out acts of terrorism, in particular acts of chemical terrorism, against Syrian civilians, in order to distort the image of the Syrian Government and prolong the war being waged against it.

The authors remain silent about the support that certain States continue to provide to terrorist groups in Syria, and they continue to cover up the aggression being committed against Syria by the "international coalition" and its militias, together with Turkey, France and Israel. The authors also have nothing to say about either the attempts by certain States to interfere in the internal affairs of Syria, or the

disastrous effects of the coercive, unilateral economic measures that have been taken against Syria by several actors, including the European Union and the United States, and the impact that those measures have had on the humanitarian situation in Syria. The Syrian Government wishes to reiterate that such conduct by the authors demonstrates that they do not abide by the humanitarian principles governing United Nations humanitarian operations, namely, impartiality, objectivity and neutrality.

The Syrian Government reaffirms that the Security Council should stop issuing these monthly reports, because they serve no purpose other than to provide a platform for certain States that are hostile to Syria to incite against and defame the Syrian State, and to waste financial and human resources that could be used to provide actual assistance, not imaginary assistance, to the Syrian people. These monthly reports should be replaced by quarterly reports that are written in professional and credible manner.

I should be grateful if the present letter could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2018/638

Security Council

Distr.: General
27 June 2018

Original: English

Letter dated 27 June 2018 from the Permanent Representative of Myanmar to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to the letter dated 31 May 2018 addressed to me by the President of the Security Council for the month of May in an effort to continue constructive and collaborative dialogue with Myanmar in finding a durable solution to the humanitarian situation in Rakhine State. I have brought the matter to the attention of the leadership of the Government of Myanmar, as requested.

I am now taking the liberty of writing the present letter to update you on recent developments and concrete steps taken by the Government of Myanmar in three specific areas identified in the letter under reference, namely humanitarian access, accountability for alleged human rights violations and implementation of the recommendations of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State.

Humanitarian access

With regard to humanitarian access, the Union Enterprise for Humanitarian Assistance, Resettlement and Development in Rakhine has been put in place to provide and coordinate humanitarian assistance for all needy communities. The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, including the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Myanmar Red Cross Society, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and the World Food Programme have been providing humanitarian assistance in Rakhine State. Individual countries from the region and other well-wishers have also been helping the affected people through the Union Enterprise for Humanitarian Assistance, Resettlement and Development in Rakhine. ICRC and the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement are doubling the distribution of food rations before the rainy season sets in and are also running mobile health clinics and distributing emergency assistance kits.

Moreover, the ongoing activities of the relevant United Nations agencies and international organizations in Rakhine State, including their travels within the State, are being facilitated by the Rakhine Coordination Committee in accordance with the provisions of respective memorandums of understanding with the government ministries concerned.

One significant development is the signing of a memorandum of understanding between the Government of Myanmar and two United Nations agencies, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the United Nations

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Development Programme, on 6 June 2018. It has opened the way not only for assisting in different stages of return and resettlement in the repatriation process, but also for enhancing humanitarian assistance and livelihood opportunities for the returnees, as well as for all communities in Rakhine State. The tripartite memorandum of understanding establishes a framework for cooperation aimed at supporting Myanmar to create conditions conducive to the voluntary, safe and dignified return of the displaced persons and to promote resilience-based recovery and development for the benefit of all communities in Rakhine State.

Addressing accountability

With regard to the accountability issue, the Government of Myanmar has repeatedly stated that it will not condone any human rights violations and will take action against perpetrators in accordance with the law when allegations are supported by sufficient evidence. In some cases, such as in the Inn Din village incident, perpetrators, including members of security forces, have already been brought to justice. The recent revelation of the massacre of 99 innocent ethnic Hindus, committed by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army on the same day as their attacks on 30 police outposts, has unmasked the true face of the Army, which must also be held accountable and should not go unpunished.

The current crisis in Rakhine was ignited by the unprovoked attacks of Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army terrorists and affected not only the Muslim community, but also Hindus and other ethnic minorities. We need to protect the human rights of all communities and provide security not only for Muslims and Rakhines, but also for Hindus and other communities. The current round of violence in Rakhine has rapidly morphed from communal tension into an issue of terrorism that threatens Myanmar's national security and sovereignty.

Another significant step taken by the Government is the announcement by the Office of the President, on 31 May 2018, of the Government's decision to establish an independent commission of enquiry as part of its national initiative to address reconciliation, peace and stability and development in Rakhine State. The commission will look into allegations of human rights violations and related issues following the terrorist attacks by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army. The Government is in the process of selecting candidates for the commission, which will comprise international and national personalities who will be assisted by experts. The Government is fully committed to taking legal action against all violations committed on Myanmar's soil.

Recommendations of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State

The Advisory Commission on Rakhine State was set up by the Government of Myanmar on its own initiative to seek a long-lasting solution to the complex challenges in Rakhine State even before the first attacks of the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army, on 9 October 2016. The Government made a statement on 24 August 2017 welcoming the Commission's final report and pledged to implement its recommendations to the fullest extent possible, depending on the situation on the ground. A ministerial-level committee was assigned for the implementation of the recommendations of the Advisory Commission, and an advisory board to the committee, comprising prominent international members, was established. The committee has submitted quarterly reports to the public on the progress of implementation and has already implemented more than 50 reports out of a total of 88 recommendations and has started on some 30 more.

The advisory board to the committee has also given its initial opinions, aimed at the effective implementation of the recommendations. Some of the board's key

recommendations, such as the establishment of an independent commission of enquiry and the seeking of assistance from United Nations agencies in the implementation of the arrangement of repatriation agreed between Myanmar and Bangladesh, have already been implemented.

Progress of repatriation process

We also share your concern over the suffering of the displaced people who have been exploited for the pernicious and ruthless strategy of the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army terrorist group. The reported number of displaced persons who left for the Bangladesh side is much inflated, as the real figure cannot be higher than half a million. Myanmar has made every effort to create an environment that is conducive to the early return of displaced people in accordance with the arrangement on the return of displaced persons from Rakhine State, signed on 23 November 2017 between Myanmar and Bangladesh. To expedite repatriation, a list of 1,222 persons, including Hindus and Muslims, verified as residents of Myanmar, was handed over to the Bangladesh side in January 2018.

As of 22 June 2018, Myanmar handed over to Bangladesh, in total, 1,788 names of those verified as residents of Myanmar from the list of 8,032 persons presented by Bangladesh in January 2018. However, Bangladesh has not sent back a single returnee to date. We would, therefore, like to seek the support of the Security Council to urge Bangladesh to start to implement the bilateral agreement and to allow those verified displaced persons to return without delay, as agreed bilaterally in the arrangement on the return of displaced persons from Rakhine State.

Last May, 62 displaced persons returned from their camps in Cox's Bazaar of their own volition. They were transported to the Hla Phoe Khaung transit centre after going through the verification process necessary at the Nga Khu Ya reception centre. The Minister for Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement visited Hla Phoe Khaung to meet the returnees and explained the resettlement and national verification process to them and provided the aid and assistance necessary.

On 11 June 2018, a wrecked boat with 104 displaced persons from Cox's Bazaar on board was stranded ashore in Yathedaung Township. Those from camps in Cox's Bazaar have been accommodated at the transit centre and given humanitarian assistance. In the interest of expediting the repatriation process, I would like to underline the urgent need for the widest possible dissemination of information on the repatriation process among displaced persons in Bangladesh and for the use of the agreed form for compiling information on prospective returnees.

Threat of Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army to national security

I would also like to take this opportunity to highlight the security aspect of the process of implementing the Myanmar-Bangladesh bilateral agreement on voluntary, safe and dignified return. As you are aware, the unprovoked and premeditated multiple attacks on police outposts on 25 August 2017 was the root cause of the current humanitarian crisis in Rakhine State. The threat of Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army terrorists remains real and present today. They continue to intimidate and kill those who advocate the return of displaced persons. In order to ensure safety and security for all communities in Rakhine, there is an urgent need for Bangladesh and other stakeholders to cooperate strongly to prevent and secure threats posed by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army.

We are committed to the bilateral solution to the humanitarian problem affecting the two countries in a spirit of mutual respect, sincerity and good neighbourliness. It is absolutely necessary to build trust between Myanmar and Bangladesh if we are to achieve our common objective of a peaceful solution to this issue. We should avoid

any provocative action that may cause misunderstanding and escalate tension that could be detrimental to the implementation of the repatriation process.

In this regard, I wish to bring to your attention the fact that Bangladesh has built overhead bunkers on its side of the border between boundary pillars Nos. 34 and 35, in violation of the boundary demarcation treaty of 12 November 1998, which prohibits the building of any structure within 150 feet of the border line. We reiterate our call upon Bangladesh to remove the said structures in compliance with the boundary treaty and to allay misunderstanding between the two countries.

Cooperation with the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar

Cooperation with the United Nations is one of the tenets of Myanmar's foreign policy. The State Counsellor issued a statement on 1 May 2018, following the visit of Security Council members to Myanmar, reiterating the Government's commitment to working in partnership with the United Nations in dealing with the many serious challenges facing the country. In this spirit, the Government of Myanmar facilitated the first official visit of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar, Christine Burgener, from 12 to 21 June 2018. Myanmar has agreed to the proposed opening of her office in Nay Pyi Taw and invited her to take part in the forthcoming Union Peace Conference. Myanmar looks forward to maintaining a constructive and fruitful relationship with the Special Envoy in our efforts to deepen the partnership with the United Nations in addressing the complex challenges confronting the country.

As a country faced with the challenges of completing the transition to a fully functioning democratic State, Myanmar appreciates the understanding and support of the international community.

In its efforts to achieve national reconciliation and peace, democracy and development, the Government of Myanmar is happy to engage constructively with the United Nations. I believe that the United Nations can help Myanmar to find a comprehensive and durable solution to this humanitarian issue.

I would highly appreciate it if the present letter could be circulated among the members of the Security Council as a document of the Council.

(*Signed*) Hau Do **Suan**
Permanent Representative

United Nations S/2018/639

Security Council

Distr.: General
28 June 2018

Original: English

France: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its previous resolutions, in particular 2391 (2017), 2374 (2017), 2364 (2017) and 2100 (2013), and its press statements of 23 May 2018, 15 April 2018 and 24 January 2018,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Mali, *emphasizing* that the Malian authorities have primary responsibility for the provision of stability, security and protection of civilians throughout the territory of Mali,

Reaffirming the basic principles of peacekeeping, including consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force, except in self-defence and defence of the mandate, and *recognizing* that the mandate of each peacekeeping mission is specific to the need and situation of the country concerned, and *recalling* its Presidential Statement of 14 May 2018 (S/PRST/2018/10),

Recognizing that the full, effective and inclusive implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali ("the Agreement") signed in 2015 by the Government of Mali, the *Plateforme* coalition of armed groups, and the *Coordination des Mouvements de l'Azawad* coalition of armed groups ("the Plateforme and Coordination armed groups"), constitutes a historic opportunity to achieve lasting peace and security in Mali,

Stressing that all parties to the Agreement share the primary responsibility to make steadfast progress in its implementation,

Taking note of the renewed commitment of the Government of Mali and the Plateforme and Coordination armed groups to the expeditious implementation of all of their remaining obligations under the Agreement, through the adoption of a "*Chronogramme d'actions prioritaires*" during the meeting of the *Comité de Suivi de l'Accord* (CSA) held in Bamako on the 15 and 16 January 2018, followed by the adoption of a Roadmap for its implementation on 22 March 2018 ("the Roadmap"),

Welcoming the mobilization of the Prime Minister in support to the implementation of the Agreement, as well as his recent visit to the Northern regions of Mali,

Expressing deep concern over the persistent delays for its full implementation three years after it was concluded, and *stressing* the pressing need to deliver tangible and visible peace dividends to the population in the North and other parts of Mali in

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order to preserve the relevance of the Agreement as well as to prevent the gains achieved from being potentially reversed,

Noting that the slow progress in the implementation of the Agreement, particularly its defence and security provisions, as well as the delayed reform of the security sector, have hampered efforts to restore security in the North of Mali, and *stressing* that acceleration of the implementation of the Agreement would contribute to enhancing State's presence and to improving the security situation across Mali and to forestalling attempts by terrorist groups to derail the implementation of the Agreement,

Affirming its intention to continue to facilitate, support and follow closely the implementation of the Agreement,

Welcoming the appointment of the Carter Center as the Independent Observer referred to in the Agreement, *recalling* that the mandate of the Independent Observer, as defined by the Agreement, is to objectively evaluate progress towards implementation of the Agreement, including through the release every 4 months of a comprehensive report on the implementation of the commitments undertaken in the Agreement, identifying any impediments, determining responsibility and recommending the steps to be taken, and *calling upon* all parties to fully cooperate with the Carter Center in order to facilitate the implementation of its mandate as Independent Observer,

Underlining that engaging in hostilities in violation of the Agreement as well as actions taken that obstruct, or that obstruct by prolonged delay, or that threaten the implementation of the Agreement constitute a basis for sanctions designations pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017), among other designation criteria, and *calling upon* all actors to cooperate fully with the Sanctions Committee and the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017),

Taking note of the announced holding of presidential and legislative elections in 2018, as well as regional, district and municipal elections in 2019,

Expressing deep concern about the continued deterioration of the security situation in Mali, especially the expansion of terrorist and other criminal activities into the Central and Southern regions as well as the intensification of intercommunal violence in the Centre,

Strongly condemning the continued attacks, including terrorist attacks, against civilians, representatives from local, regional and State institutions, as well as national, international and UN security forces, including the Malian Defence and Security Forces (MDSF), United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), the French forces and the European Union Training Mission in Mali (EUTM Mali),

Strongly condemning the activities in Mali and in the Sahel region of terrorist organizations, including MUJAO, Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Al Mourabitoune, Ansar Eddine, and associated individuals and groups such as Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims) and Islamic State in Greater Sahara and Ansaroul Islam, which continue to operate in Mali and constitute a threat to peace and security in the region and beyond, human rights abuses and violations, and violence against civilians, notably women and children, committed in Mali and in the region by terrorist groups,

Emphasizing that security and stability in Mali are inextricably linked to that of the Sahel and West Africa, as well as to that of Libya and North Africa, and *expressing* its deep concern regarding the transnational threat posed by terrorism and organized

crime (including trafficking in persons, arms, drugs and natural resources, and the smuggling of migrants) in the Sahel region,

Recognizing that MINUSMA and the *Force conjointe du G5 Sahel* (FC-G5S) have the potential to be mutually beneficial instruments to restore peace and stability in Mali and in the Sahel region, and *underlining* that they have the potential to constitute a positive interaction between a United Nations peacekeeping operation and an African operation,

Welcoming the continued action by the French forces, at the request and in support of the Malian authorities, to deter the terrorist threat in the North of Mali,

Commending the role of EUTM Mali in providing training and advice in Mali for the MDSF and the FC-G5S, including by contributing to the strengthening of civilian authority and respect for human rights, and *further commending* the role of the European Union Capacity Building Mission in Mali (EUCAP Sahel Mali) in providing strategic advice and training for the *Police*, *Gendarmerie* and *Garde nationale* in Mali,

Strongly condemning all violations and abuses of international human rights law and violations of international humanitarian law, including those involving extrajudicial and summary executions, arbitrary arrests and detentions and ill-treatment of prisoners, sexual and gender-based violence, as well as killing, maiming, recruitment and use of children, attacks against schools and hospitals, *calling on* all parties to respect the civilian character of schools in accordance with international humanitarian law and to cease detention of all children on national security charges in violation of applicable international law, and *further calling upon* all parties to bring an end to such violations and abuses and to comply with their obligations under applicable international law,

Reiterating, in this regard, that all perpetrators of such acts must be held accountable and that some of such acts referred to in the paragraph above may amount to crimes under the Rome Statute, *taking note* that, acting upon the referral of the transitional authorities of Mali dated 13 July 2012, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) opened, on 16 January 2013, an investigation into alleged crimes committed on the territory of Mali since January 2012, *recalling* the importance of assistance and cooperation, by all parties concerned, with the ICC, in matters that are within its jurisdiction, and *welcoming* in this regard the recent transfer of Al-Hassan Ag Abdoul Aziz Ag Mohamed Ag Mahmoud to the custody of the ICC,

Recognizing the essential contribution of the transitional justice mechanisms referred to in the Agreement to the promotion of a durable peace in Mali and accountability for human rights abuses and violations, *noting* the gradual progress achieved in the operationalization of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, *stressing* the need for the Government to extend its mandate beyond December 2018, *welcoming* the establishment of the International Commission of Inquiry, in accordance with the Agreement, and *encouraging* its operationalization,

Taking positive note of Mali's second National Action Plan for the implementation of the Security Council resolution 1325 (2000), as well as of Mali's legislation requiring a 30 per cent quota for women in national institutions, and *encouraging* their full and swift implementation,

Welcoming the signing of an action plan to end and prevent recruitment and use of children and sexual violence against children by the Coordination armed group and the United Nations in March 2017, *calling for* its full and immediate implementation, and *encouraging* the immediate development and implementation of an action plan by the Plateforme armed groups and the United Nations to prevent the unlawful recruitment and use of children and sexual violence against children,

Emphasizing the need for all parties to uphold and respect the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence in order to ensure the continued provision of humanitarian assistance, the safety and protection of civilians receiving assistance and the security of humanitarian personnel operating in Mali, and *stressing* the importance of humanitarian assistance being delivered on the basis of need,

Remaining seriously concerned over the significant ongoing food and humanitarian crisis in Mali, and over the insecurity which hinders humanitarian access, exacerbated by the presence of armed groups, terrorist and criminal networks, and their activities, the presence of landmines, improvised explosive devices and explosive remnants of war, as well as the continued illicit proliferation of weapons from within and outside the region that threatens the peace, security, and stability of States in this region, *condemning* attacks against humanitarian personnel, and *calling on* Member States and international and regional organizations to respond swiftly to the humanitarian appeal through increased contributions and to ensure that all pledges are honoured in a full and timely manner,

Recognizing the adverse effects of climate change, ecological changes and natural disasters, among other factors, on the stability of Mali, including through drought, desertification, land degradation and food insecurity, and *emphasizing* the need for adequate risk assessment and risk management strategies by the government of Mali and the United Nations relating to these factors,

Commending troop- and police- contributing countries of MINUSMA for their contribution, *paying tribute* to the peacekeepers who risk, as well as lost, their lives in this respect, *strongly condemning* attacks against peacekeepers, *underlining* that these attacks may constitute war crimes under international law, *stressing* that those responsible for these acts should be held accountable, *calling* on the Government of Mali to swiftly investigate and bring the perpetrators to justice and *further stressing* the importance of MINUSMA having the necessary capacities to promote the safety and security of the United Nations peacekeepers,

Reiterating its serious concern at the continuing lack of key capabilities for MINUSMA, *stressing* the need to fill gaps in, in particular in the field of military helicopters and mine protected vehicles, and to strengthen MINUSMA's capabilities to enable it to implement its mandate in a complex security environment that includes asymmetric threats, and *emphasizing* the utmost importance of improving logistics support to ensure the security and safety of MINUSMA's personnel in that regard,

Welcoming the significant progress made in the deployment of a combat convoy battalion and of a quick reaction force, *further welcoming* the recent pledges announced to fill in troops and capacity gaps, and *urging* Member States who expressed pledges to fully deploy these units within the announced time frame,

Recalling that it is important that all MINUSMA contingents are properly trained and effectively equipped, including with adequate language skills, staffed and supported to be able to sustain their commitment to carry out their respective tasks,

Recalling resolution 2378 (2017), which requests the Secretary-General to ensure that data related to the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations, including peacekeeping performance data, is used to improve analytics and evaluation of mission operations, based on clear and well identified benchmarks,

Noting the publication of the report on "Improving Security of United Nations Peacekeepers", which highlights the link between the safety and security of peacekeepers and the performance of troops, and *recognizing* that fatalities can be a consequence of deficiencies in training, equipment and performance,

Welcoming the initiative of the Secretary-General to conduct Special Investigations into performance issues, and *encouraging* the Secretary-General to report on the findings of such investigations and efforts to take collective action to improve peacekeeping operations,

Reiterating its strong support for the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Mali and Head of MINUSMA ("the SRSG"), and for MINUSMA to assist, as mandated, the Malian authorities and the Malian people in their efforts to bring lasting peace and stability to their country,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General (S/2018/541), which builds on the findings and recommendations of the independent strategic review of MINUSMA conducted in the first half of 2018,

Determining that the situation in Mali continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

Implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali

1. *Welcomes* the recent positive steps achieved in the implementation of the Agreement ahead of the electoral cycles due to take place in Mali in 2018, through the establishment of the regions of Taoudénit and Ménaka, progress in the operationalization of Operational Coordination Mechanisms in Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu, progress in the cantonment and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes through the pre-registration of combatants, as well as the holding of a high-level workshop on security sector reform, with a particular emphasis on the concepts of reconstituted armed and security forces and of territorial police force;

2. *Expresses* its deep frustration that parties have too long stalled the implementation of the Agreement, in spite of significant international support and assistance, *expresses* a significant sense of impatience with parties over the persistent delays in the full implementation of key provisions of the Agreement and *stresses* the absolute urgency for the Government of Mali and the Plateforme and Coordination armed groups to take unprecedented steps to fully and expeditiously deliver on remaining obligations under the Agreement;

3. *Expresses its intention* to follow closely the timely implementation of the Roadmap referred to above and to respond with measures pursuant to resolution 2374 (2017) should the parties not implement the agreed-upon commitments within the announced time frame;

4. *Urges* the Government of Mali and the Plateforme and Coordination armed groups to take immediate and concrete action to implement key provisions of the Agreement referenced in the Roadmap, through:

- the holding of the presidential elections in a peaceful environment, with the support of the signatory armed groups,
- progress in the decentralization process, including through the adoption, following adequate consultations, of a decree setting out arrangements for the transfer of decentralized State services to local authorities in their areas of competence, as well as through the adoption, following adequate consultations, of legislation establishing a regional territorial police force,
- the operationalization of the interim administrations in the North of Mali, including through the allocation of the necessary human, technical and financial resources to perform their missions,

- progress in the cantonment and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) processes, as well as in an inclusive and consensual security sector reform, with a view to the progressive redeployment of the reconstituted and reformed defence and security forces in Mali, through the registration of all combatants eligible to the DDR process by the end of 2018, the effective launch of an accelerated cantonment, the completed integration of at least 1000 members of the signatory armed groups in the MDSF, and the start of the socioeconomic reintegration of unintegrated members of the signatory armed groups with the support of international partners, including the World Bank,

- the full operationalization of mixed units of the Operational Coordination Mechanism in Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu,

- progress towards the socioeconomic development of the North of Mali, through the adoption of legislation establishing the Northern Development Zone, following the holding of a high-level workshop addressing all related issues,

- ensuring equal and meaningful participation of women, including through greater representation of women in the mechanisms established by the Agreement to support and monitor its implementation, including the interim authorities;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to take appropriate steps to allow for the swift conclusion of a "Pact for Peace" between the Government of Mali and the United Nations, with the support of the members of the international mediation, in the wake of the upcoming presidential elections, as recommended in his report referred to above, with the overall objectives to accelerate the implementation of the Agreement, contribute to the stabilization of Mali and strengthen the coherence of international efforts in Mali, with the support of MINUSMA, on the basis of mutual commitments by all actors involved, *encourages* that this pact relies on agreed-upon benchmarks related to governance, rule of law and implementation of the Agreement, and specifically to its key provisions, including progress in the decentralization process, inclusive and consensual reform of the security sector, national reconciliation measures and socioeconomic development, and *further requests* that the Secretary-General provides regular updates to the Security Council on the preparation of this "Pact for Peace";

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council, 6 months after the presidential inauguration, on progress achieved in the implementation of the measures referenced in paragraph 4 above and of the benchmarks developed in the framework of the "Pact for Peace", *expresses its intent* to examine progress achieved in the implementation of the Agreement on the basis of the report of the Secretary-General, and *further expresses its intent*, in the absence of significant progress in the implementation of the measures and benchmarks referenced above, to request the Secretary-General to provide options for potential significant adaptation of MINUSMA after the expiration of its current mandate;

7. *Welcomes* the signatory armed groups' agreement on a definitive cessation of hostilities through the signing of a "document of commitments" on 20 September 2017, and *calls upon* all parties to the Agreement to strictly abide to the arrangements in place for a cessation of hostilities;

8. *Demands* that all armed groups in Mali put aside their arms, cease hostilities, reject the recourse to violence, cut off all ties with terrorist organizations, take concrete steps to enhance their cooperation and coordination with the Government of Mali to eliminate the terrorist threat, and recognize, without conditions, the unity and territorial integrity of the Malian State, within the framework of the Agreement;

9. *Urges* all parties in Mali to cooperate fully with the SRSG and MINUSMA, and *further urges* all parties to ensure the safety, security and freedom of movement of MINUSMA's personnel with unhindered and immediate access throughout the territory of Mali to enable MINUSMA to carry out fully its mandate;

10. *Calls for* the inclusion within national and regional strategies of programs to support community efforts to address the stigma of sexual and gender-based violence and the reintegration of survivors into their communities;

11. *Calls upon* the Government of Mali to finalize its strategy for the development of the North of Mali and the national emergency plan;

12. *Requests* the SRSG to use his good offices to encourage and support the full implementation of the Agreement, in particular by playing a central role to support and oversee the implementation of the Agreement by the Government of Mali, the Plateforme and Coordination armed groups, notably by heading the Secretariat of the CSA, and in particular, to assist the Malian parties in identifying and prioritizing implementation steps, consistent with the provisions of the Agreement;

13. *Calls on* the members of the CSA and other relevant international partners, including G5 Sahel States, to increase their engagement in support to the implementation of the Agreement, as well as to continue to coordinate their efforts in this regard with the SRSG and MINUSMA, and *recognizes* the role of the CSA to reconcile disagreements between the Malian parties;

14. *Takes positive note* of the publication of the first report of the Independent Observer on 28 May 2018, *calls upon* the Independent Observer to continue to make public, including through presentation to the CSA, regular reports containing concrete recommendations on steps to be taken by all parties to accelerate the full, effective and inclusive implementation of the Agreement;

15. *Welcomes* the establishment of an International Commission of Inquiry, in accordance with the Agreement and as requested by resolution 2364 (2017), and *calls upon* all parties to cooperate fully with it;

16. *Encourages* all relevant United Nations agencies, as well as regional, bilateral and multilateral partners to provide the necessary support to contribute to the implementation of the Agreement by the Malian parties, in particular its provisions pertaining to socioeconomic, cultural and environmental development;

Situation in Central Mali

17. *Underlines* that stabilization of the situation in Central Mali requires a fully integrated plan encompassing simultaneous pursuit of progress on security, governance, development, reconciliation, as well as protection and promotion of human rights;

18. *Welcomes* the measures taken by the Government of Mali to support the implementation of its comprehensive plan to re-establish state presence in Central Mali (*Plan de sécurisation intégrée des regions du Centre* — PSIRC), and *urges* further and continued efforts in this direction, consistent with provisions of paragraph 17 above;

Electoral cycles

19. *Stresses* the need for the elections referred to above to be inclusive, free, fair, transparent, credible, and conducted in a peaceful environment, *underlines* the primary responsibility of the Government of Mali in ensuring this, and *further stresses* the need to ensure adequate coordination of the electoral process with the implementation of the Agreement;

20. *Takes note* of the measures taken until now to ensure proper preparation of the electoral process as well as to hold the upcoming electoral cycles according to the announced time frame, and *encourages* continued efforts in this direction;

21. *Calls on* the Government of Mali to ensure the protection of the right to peaceful assembly, including in the context of the ongoing state of emergency, and *further calls upon* all actors to show restraint, refrain from violence and the incitement thereof, as well as to resolve any potential disputes over the conduct of the elections through the use of established legal mechanisms;

22. *Requests* the SRSG to use his good offices to support the preparation, conduct and conclusion of the upcoming electoral cycles in pursuance of the conditions referenced in paragraph 19 above;

23. *Calls for* the continuation of a constructive dialogue between the Government, the Opposition and all relevant stakeholders on the modalities of the presidential elections, which is essential for the transparency and the credibility of the electoral process, and *supports* the efforts currently deployed by the SRSG in coordination with the African Union High-Representative and Head of MISAHEL and ECOWAS representative to support such dialogue;

MINUSMA's mandate

General principles

24. *Decides* to extend the mandate of MINUSMA until 30 June 2019;

25. *Decides* that MINUSMA shall continue to comprise up to 13,289 military personnel and 1,920 police personnel, and *requests* the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps to expedite force and asset generation, as well as deployment, including as set out in paragraph 58 below;

26. *Decides* that the strategic priority of MINUSMA remains to support the implementation by the Government, the Plateforme and Coordination armed groups, as well as by other relevant Malian stakeholders, of the Agreement, in particular its political and security key provisions, notably the gradual restoration and extension of State authority and services, the definition of a new institutional architecture, the inclusive and consensual reform of the security sector and national reconciliation measures, and *requests* MINUSMA to reprioritize its resources and efforts to focus on political tasks;

27. *Stresses* that MINUSMA's mandate should be implemented based on a prioritization of tasks established in paragraphs 38 and 39 below, *requests* the Secretary-General to reflect this prioritization in the deployment of the mission and to align budgetary resources according to the prioritization of mandate tasks as set out in this resolution, while ensuring appropriate resources for the implementation of the mandate, and, in this regard, *reaffirms* that the support to the implementation of the Agreement should be given priority in decisions about the use of available capacity and resources;

28. *Requests* MINUSMA to strengthen its efforts to improve coordination between its civil, military and police components, including through an integrated approach to operational planning and intelligence as well as through the establishment of intra-mission dedicated coordination mechanisms;

29. *Encourages* the Secretary-General to develop an integrated strategic framework setting the United Nations' overall vision, joint priorities and internal division of labour to sustain peace in Mali, *further requests* the Secretary-General to ensure an efficient division of tasks and complementarity of efforts between MINUSMA and the United Nations Country Team (UNCT), based on their mandates

and comparative advantages, to support the implementation of the Agreement, as well as to continuously adjust this deployment according to the progress made in the implementation of MINUSMA's mandate, consistent with the division of tasks with the UNCT requested in paragraph 71 below, while stressing the importance of adequate resources for the UNCT, *calls on* the UNCT to enhance its presence and activities in the Northern and Central regions of Mali, and *encourages* Member States and relevant organizations to consider providing the necessary voluntary funding to this end;

30. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to ensure enhanced cooperation and information sharing, where appropriate, between MINUSMA, the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS), sub-regional organizations, including ECOWAS and the G5 Sahel, as well as Member States in the region;

31. *Requests* MINUSMA, in coordination with relevant partners, including the UNOWAS and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, to enhance its awareness of the financial sources of conflicts in Mali, including trafficking in persons, arms, drugs and natural resources, and the smuggling of migrants, and of its implication on the regional security environment, in order to contribute to the definition of integrated and effective strategies in support of long-term peace and stability in Mali and the region;

32. *Authorizes* MINUSMA to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate, within its capabilities and its areas of deployment;

33. *Requests* MINUSMA to continue to carry out its mandate with a proactive and robust posture;

34. *Requests* MINUSMA, in pursuit of its relevant priority tasks and active defence of its mandate, to continue anticipate and deter threats and to take robust and active steps to counter asymmetric attacks against civilians or United Nations personnel, to ensure prompt and effective responses to threats of violence against civilians and to prevent a return of armed elements to those areas, engaging in direct operations pursuant only to serious and credible threats;

35. *Expresses* its deep concern regarding the heavy number of losses of peacekeepers in Mali and *requests* MINUSMA to continue to protect the United Nations personnel, notably uniformed personnel, installations and equipment and ensure the safety, security and freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel, and, in this context, to periodically review all implemented safety and security measures;

36. *Encourages* the Secretary-General to keep the Mission concept under continuous review, specifically noting the repeated attacks against the mission as well as the deterioration of the security situation and the weakening of State's presence in the Centre of Mali, in order to maximize the positive impact of MINUSMA's resources and make operational adjustments where necessary, *further encourages* the reconfiguration of MINUSMA posture to optimize and rebalance the uniformed and civilian presences in the Central region, at the discretion of the SRSG, in close consultation with the Force Commander and without impeding its ability to pursue its strategic priority in the North, and *requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council informed on the implementation of such measures;

37. *Underlines the importance* for MINUSMA to consider potential measures, as appropriate, as applicable, in line with its protection of civilians mandate as set out in paragraph 38 (d) below, and within existing resources, with a view to reducing or avoiding potential collateral damages among civilians which could result from attacks against the mission's camps;

Priority tasks

38. *Decides* that MINUSMA's mandate shall include the following priority tasks:

(a) *Support to the implementation of the Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali*

(i) To support the implementation of the political and institutional reforms provided by the Agreement, especially in its Part II, notably to support the Government's efforts for the effective restoration and extension of State authority and rule of law throughout the territory, including through supporting the effective functioning of interim administrations in the North of Mali under the conditions set out in the Agreement;

(ii) To support the implementation of the defence and security measures of the Agreement, especially its Part III and Annex 2, notably:

- to support, monitor and supervise the ceasefire, including through the continued implementation of control measures on movement and armament of signatory armed groups, and to report to the Security Council on violations of it,
- to support the deployment of joint security patrols in the North of Mali, where necessary and where possible,
- to support the cantonment, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of armed groups, including through the integration of elements of the signatory armed groups in the MDSF as an interim measure, and the continued implementation of a community violence reduction programme, within the framework of an inclusive and consensual reform of the security sector, taking into account the particular needs of women and children and without prejudice to the anticipated plans of the demobilization, disarmament and reintegration and integration commissions,
- to support the redeployment of the reformed and reconstituted MDSF in the North of Mali, including through operational, logistical and transportation support during coordinated operations and joint operations, mentoring, planning, strengthened information sharing, and medical evacuation, within existing resources, without prejudice to the basic principles of peacekeeping,
- to ensure coherence of international efforts, in close collaboration with other bilateral partners, donors and international organizations, including the European Union, engaged in these fields, to rebuild the Malian security sector, within the framework set out by the Agreement;

(iii) To support the implementation of the reconciliation and justice measures of the Agreement, especially in its Part V, by continuing its current activities, including with respect to the support of the operations of the International Commission of Inquiry, in consultation with the parties, support to the work of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, support to the effectiveness of justice and corrections officials in the North and Centre of the country and to associated interim authorities, and technical support to Malian judicial institutions regarding the detention, investigation and prosecution of individuals suspected of, and sentencing of those found responsible for, terrorism-related crimes, mass atrocities and transnational organized crime activities (including trafficking in persons, arms, drugs and natural resources, and the smuggling of migrants), which risk destabilizing the peace process;

(iv) To support, within its resources and areas of deployment, the conduct of inclusive, free, fair, transparent, and credible elections, conducted in a peaceful environment, as well as the holding of a constitutional referendum, including through the provision of appropriate technical assistance and security arrangements, consistent with the provisions of the Agreement;

(b) *Support to the restoration of State authority in the Centre*

To support the redeployment of the MDSF in the Centre of Mali, including through continued operational, logistical and transportation support during coordinated operations and joint operations, mentoring, planning, strengthened information sharing and medical evacuation, within existing resources, without prejudice to the basic principles of peacekeeping;

(c) *Good offices and reconciliation*

(i) To exercise good offices, confidence-building and facilitation at the national and local levels, in order to support dialogue with and among all stakeholders towards reconciliation and social cohesion;

(ii) To support efforts to reduce intercommunal tensions, bearing in mind the primary responsibility of the Malian authorities;

(iii) To support the holding of inclusive, free, fair, transparent and credible elections, conducted in a peaceful environment;

(iv) To encourage and support the full implementation of the Agreement by the Government of Mali, the Plateforme and Coordination armed groups, and all relevant non-signatory actors, including by promoting the meaningful participation of civil society, including women's organizations as well as youth organizations;

(d) *Protection of civilians and stabilization, including against asymmetric threats*

(i) To protect, without prejudice to the primary responsibility of the Malian authorities, civilians under threat of physical violence, including through public information, community outreach, dialogue and direct engagement;

(ii) In support of the Malian authorities, to stabilize the key population centres and other areas where civilians are at risk, notably in the Centre and North of Mali, and, in this regard:

- to enhance early warning and documentation of the impact of conflict and violence on civilians,
- to anticipate, deter and counter threats, including asymmetric threats,
- to strengthen community engagement and protection mechanisms, including through reconciliation, mediation and support to the resolution of local conflicts,
- to take robust and active steps to protect civilians, including through active and effective patrolling in areas where civilians are at risk, mitigating the risk to civilians before, during and after any military operation,
- to prevent the return of armed elements to those areas, engaging in direct operations pursuant only to serious and credible threats;

(iii) To provide specific protection for women and children affected by armed conflict, including through Child Protection Advisors and Women Protection Advisors as well as consultations with women's organizations, and address the needs of victims of sexual and gender-based violence in armed conflict;

(e) *Promotion and protection of human rights*

(i) To assist the Malian authorities in their efforts to promote and protect human rights, in particular in the areas of justice and reconciliation, including to support, as feasible and appropriate, the efforts of the Malian authorities, without prejudice to their responsibilities, to bring to justice those responsible for serious violations or abuses of human rights or violations of international humanitarian law, in particular war crimes and crimes against humanity in Mali, taking into account the referral by the transitional authorities of Mali of the situation in their country since January 2012 to the ICC;

(ii) To monitor, help investigate and report publicly and regularly to the Security Council, on violations of international humanitarian law and on violations and abuses of human rights, including all forms of sexual and gender-based violence and violations and abuses committed against women and children throughout Mali and to contribute to efforts to prevent such violations and abuses;

(f) *Humanitarian assistance*

In support of the Malian authorities, to contribute to the creation of a secure environment for the safe, civilian-led delivery of humanitarian assistance, in accordance with humanitarian principles, and the voluntary, safe and dignified return of internally displaced persons and refugees, or local integration or resettlement of internally displaced persons and refugees in close coordination with humanitarian actors;

Other tasks

39. *Further authorizes* MINUSMA, without impeding on its capacity to implement its priority tasks, to use its existing capacities to assist in implementing the following other tasks in a streamlined and sequenced manner, bearing in mind that priority and secondary tasks are mutually reinforcing:

(a) *Projects for stabilization*

In support of the Malian authorities, to contribute to the creation of a secure environment for projects, including quick impact projects, aimed at stabilizing the North of Mali;

(b) *Weapons and ammunition management*

To assist the Malian authorities with the removal and destruction of mines and other explosive devices and weapons and ammunition management;

(c) *Cooperation with Sanctions Committees*

To assist and exchange information with the Sanctions Committee and the Panel of experts established by resolution 2374;

To assist the 1267/1989/2253 ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee and the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team established by resolution 1526 (2004), including by passing information relevant to the implementation of the measures in paragraph 1 of resolution 2368 (2017);

Other security presences in Mali and the Sahel region

40. *Recognizes* that, in light of the specific and challenging environment in which it is deployed, MINUSMA interacts with other security presences which have the potential to be mutually beneficial instruments to restore peace and stability in Mali and the Sahel region, *further recognizes* that these security presences share the

strategic objective to support the full, effective and inclusive implementation of the Agreement, while acknowledging the specificities of their respective mandates and postures;

41. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to ensure adequate coordination, exchange of information and, when applicable, support, within their respective mandates and through existing mechanisms, between MINUSMA, the MDSF, the FC-G5S, the French Forces and the European Union missions in Mali, *further requests* MINUSMA to strengthen its strategic communication towards all Malian stakeholders and towards local populations, with the objective to enhance awareness and understanding about the nature, impact and specificities of its mandate and activities;

42. *Stresses* that security responses to the threats faced by Mali can only be effective if complemented by the full, effective and inclusive implementation of the Agreement, if accompanied by the rapid and effective implementation of inclusive regional strategies by relevant actors encompassing security, governance, development, human rights and humanitarian issues, as well as if conducted in full compliance with international law, by taking feasible precautions to minimize the risk of harm to civilians in all areas of operations;

Malian Defence and Security Forces

43. *Affirms* that the gradual restoration and extension of State authority across the territory of Mali, in particular the reformed and reconstituted MDSF, consistent with the provisions of the Agreement and in accordance with international human rights law and international humanitarian law, as applicable, would contribute significantly to the stability of Mali and to deter the terrorist threat, and thus facilitate the fulfilment by MINUSMA of its mandate to stabilize Mali;

44. *Strongly condemns* the continued terrorist attacks against MDSF, *expresses serious concerns* about repeated allegations of violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law by MDSF in the conduct of counterterrorism operations, including in Central Mali, *urges* the Government of Mali to carry out transparent and credible investigations on alleged violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law by MDSF, *calls for* those responsible for such violations or abuses to be held accountable, *takes positive note* of the measures announced by the Government of Mali in response to several allegations referred to above and *urges* for the effective implementation of those measures, in pursuance of the conditions referred to above;

45. *Requests* MINUSMA to ensure that any of its support to the MDSF is provided in strict compliance with the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations security forces (HRDDP), *calls upon* the Government of Mali to implement all recommendations made by MINUSMA in the framework of the HRDDP, and *encourages* international partners to insist on respect for international human rights law, international humanitarian law and accountability as a necessary condition when partnering with the MDSF or other armed actors;

46. *Urges* MINUSMA and the Government of Mali to redouble their efforts towards ensuring a swift, full and effective implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding on support to the redeployment of MDSF;

47. *Encourages* bilateral and multilateral partners to continue to increase their support to accelerate the redeployment of the MDSF, once reformed and reconstituted, to the North of Mali, particularly by providing relevant equipment and training, in coordination with the Government of Mali and MINUSMA and within the framework of the Agreement;

Force conjointe du G5 Sahel

48. *Stresses* that the efforts of the FC-G5S to counter the activities of terrorist groups and other organized criminal groups will contribute to create a more secure environment in the Sahel region, and thus facilitate the fulfilment by MINUSMA of its mandate to stabilize Mali, and *further stresses* that operational and logistical support from MINUSMA, as per the conditions set by resolution 2391 (2017), has the potential to allow the FC-G5S, given its current level of capacities, to enhance its ability to deliver on its mandate;

49. *Welcomes* the signing on 23 February 2018 of a technical agreement between the United Nations, the EU and the G5 Sahel with a view to providing specified operational and logistical support through MINUSMA to the FC-G5S, as per the conditions set by resolution 2391 (2017), *further welcomes* the operationalization of the support to the FC-G5S through the technical agreement following the disbursement of a contribution of the EU for an amount of 10 million euros, and *calls on* donors to further contribute without delay, in order to guarantee full implementation and functionality of the technical agreement;

50. *Requests* the Secretary-General to enhance exchange of information between MINUSMA and the G5 Sahel States, through provision of relevant intelligence;

51. *Recalls* that adherence to the compliance framework referred to in resolution 2391 (2017) is essential in ensuring the required trust among the populations, and thus the effectiveness and legitimacy of the FC-G5S;

52. *Requests* MINUSMA to ensure that any of its support to the FC-G5S is provided in strict compliance with the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations security forces (HRDDP), and *calls upon* the FC-G5S to cooperate with the United Nations in implementing the HRDDP, including by ensuring that the relevant monitoring and reporting mechanisms are in place and functional;

French forces

53. *Authorizes* French forces, within the limits of their capacities and areas of deployment, to use all necessary means until the end of MINUSMA's mandate as authorized in this resolution, to intervene in support of elements of MINUSMA when under imminent and serious threat upon request of the Secretary-General, and *requests* France to report to the Council on the implementation of this mandate in Mali and to coordinate its reporting with the reporting by the Secretary-General referred to in paragraph 70 below;

European Union contribution

54. *Calls on* the European Union, notably its Special Representative for the Sahel and its EUTM Mali and EUCAP Sahel Mali missions, to coordinate closely with MINUSMA and bilateral partners of Mali engaged to assist the Malian authorities in the Security Sector Reform (SSR), as provided for by the Agreement and consistent with paragraph 38 (a) (ii) above;

Capacities of MINUSMA, safety and security of MINUSMA's personnel

55. *Requests* the Secretary-General to take all necessary steps, including through the full use of existing authorities and extraordinary administrative measures, to enable MINUSMA to reach its full operational capacity without further delay;

56. *Urges* MINUSMA's troop- and police- contributing countries to expedite the procurement and deployment of all necessary contingent-owned equipment, *urges* Member States to provide troops and police that have adequate capabilities, predeployment and, where appropriate, in situ training and equipment, including enablers, specific to the operating environment, in order for MINUSMA to fulfil its mandate, *further urges* Members States which do not meet the above mentioned criteria to consider positively the armoured personnel carrier lease offers formulated by equipment-contributing countries, and *welcomes* the assistance of Member States to MINUSMA's troop- and police-contributing countries in this regard;

57. *Commends* the commitment of the troop- and police-contributing countries in implementing the MINUSMA's mandate in a challenging environment, and in this connection, takes note of the Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) signed between the United Nations and the troop- and police-contributing countries, and calls on troop- and police-contributing countries to fully and effectively implement the provisions of these MoUs and to declare all nationals caveats as well;

58. *Welcomes* the initiatives undertaken by the Secretary General to standardize a culture of performance in UN peacekeeping, and calls on him to continue his efforts to develop an integrated performance policy framework and apply it to MINUSMA, *requests* the Secretary-General to seek to increase the number of women in MINUSMA, as well as to ensure the meaningful participation of women in all aspects of operations;

59. *Takes note* of the presentation of the report on "Improving Security of United Nations Peacekeepers", *welcomes* the action plan developed by MINUSMA to improve the security of its personnel, *encourages* its swift and continued implementation, and *requests* the Secretary-General to continue to take all appropriate additional measures to review and enhance the safety and security of MINUSMA's personnel and to enable MINUSMA to execute effectively its mandate in a complex security environment that includes asymmetric threats, including through:

- improving MINUSMA's intelligence and analysis capacities, including surveillance and monitoring capacities, within the limits of its mandate,
- providing training and equipment to counter explosive devices, including enhanced support to troop and police contributing countries to deploy the environment specific mine-protected vehicles needed under the current Force requirements,
- improving logistics in mission, in particular by securing MINUSMA's logistical supply routes, including through the deployment of combat convoy battalions and the use of modern technology such as multiple sensors, intelligence fusion and unmanned aerial systems, as well as by exploring potential alternative logistical supply routes,
- enhancing camps protection, including through the urgent deployment of indirect fire attack early warning devices, such as ground alert radars, on premises not yet equipped,
- implementing more effective casualty and medical evacuation procedures, as well as deploying enhanced medical evacuation capacities,
- taking active and effective measures to improve the planning and functioning of MINUSMA's safety and security facilities and arrangements,
- securing long-term rotation schemes for critical capabilities as well as exploring innovative options to promote partnerships between equipment, troop- and police-contributing countries;

60. *Calls upon* Member States, especially those in the region, to ensure the free, unhindered and expeditious movement to and from Mali of all personnel, as well as equipment, provisions, supplies and other goods, which are for the exclusive and official use of MINUSMA, in order to facilitate the timely and cost-effective delivery of the logistical supply of MINUSMA, and in this regard, *requests* the Secretary-General to take all necessary measures to facilitate the logistical supply of MINUSMA and to consolidate supply routes, including through using alternative routes;

Obligations under international law, human rights policy and related aspects

61. *Urges* the Malian authorities to further combat impunity and, in this regard, to ensure that all perpetrators of crimes involving violations and abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law, including those involving sexual and gender based violence, are held accountable and brought to justice without undue delay, and *also urges* the Malian authorities to continue to cooperate with the ICC, in accordance with Mali's obligations under the Rome Statute, in matters that are within its jurisdiction;

62. *Urges* all parties to comply with obligations under international humanitarian law to respect and protect humanitarian and medical personnel, facilities and relief consignments, and take all required steps to allow and facilitate the full, safe, immediate and unimpeded access of humanitarian actors for the delivery of humanitarian assistance to all people in need, while respecting the United Nations humanitarian guiding principles and applicable international law;

63. *Reiterates* that the Malian authorities have primary responsibility to protect civilians in Mali, *recalls* its past resolutions on the Protection of civilians in armed conflicts, Children and armed conflicts, and Women, peace and security, *calls upon* MINUSMA and all military forces in Mali to take them into account and to abide by international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law, *recalls* the importance of training in this regard, *urges* all parties to implement the conclusions on Children And Armed Conflict in Mali adopted by the Security Council working group on 19 June 2018, *calls upon* the Government of Mali to finalize and sign a joint communique with the UN on addressing sexual and gender-based violence in conflict, and *further calls upon* the Plateforme armed group to implement the commitments contained in its *Communiqué sur la prévention des violences sexuelles liées au conflit au Mali* of June 2016 and upon the Coordination armed group to make similar commitments;

64. *Requests* MINUSMA to take fully into account gender considerations as a cross-cutting issue throughout its mandate and to assist the Malian authorities in ensuring the full and effective participation, involvement and representation of women at all levels and at an early stage of the stabilization phase, including the security sector reform and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes, as well as in reconciliation and electoral processes, *further requests* MINUSMA to assist the parties to ensure women's full and active participation in the implementation of the Agreement, and *further requests* enhanced reporting by MINUSMA to the Security Council on this issue;

65. *Requests* the Secretary-General to ensure full compliance of MINUSMA with the United Nations zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuses and to keep the Council fully informed if such cases of misconduct occur, and *urges* troop- and police-contributing countries to take appropriate preventative action, including predeployment awareness training, and to ensure full accountability in cases of such conduct involving their personnel;

66. *Requests* MINUSMA to take fully into account child protection as a cross-cutting issue throughout its mandate and to assist the Malian authorities in ensuring that the protection of children's rights is taken into account, inter alia, in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes and in security sector reform in order to end and prevent violations and abuses against children;

Environmental issues

67. *Requests* MINUSMA to consider the environmental impacts of its operations when fulfilling its mandated tasks and, in this context, to manage them as appropriate and in accordance with applicable and relevant General Assembly resolutions and United Nations rules and regulations, and to operate mindfully in the vicinity of cultural and historical sites;

68. *Notes the importance* for the Government of Mali and the United Nations to take into consideration, as appropriate, the security implications of the adverse effects of climate change and other ecological changes and natural disasters, among other factors, in their activities, programs and strategies in Mali;

Small arms and light weapons

69. *Calls upon* the Malian authorities, with the assistance of MINUSMA, consistent with paragraph 16 above, and international partners, to address the issue of the proliferation and illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons in accordance with the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials and the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons, in order to ensure the safe and effective management, storage and security of their stockpiles of small arms and light weapons and the collection and/or destruction of surplus, seized, unmarked or illicitly held weapons, and *further stresses* the importance of the full implementation of its resolutions 2017 (2011), 2117 (2013) and 2220 (2015);

Reports by the Secretary-General

70. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council every three months after the adoption of this resolution on the implementation of this resolution, focusing:

(i) on the progress in the implementation of the Agreement and on MINUSMA's efforts to support it,

(ii) on progress in the implementation of the measures taken to improve MINUSMA's performance and effectiveness to implement its mandate, as outlined in paragraphs 55 to 60 above, including measures to enhance the safety and security of MINUSMA's personnel and to implement a comprehensive approach to protection of civilians,

(iii) on coordination, exchange of information and, when applicable, mutual operational and logistical support, between MINUSMA, the MDSF, the FC-G5S, the French Forces and the European Union missions in Mali, as outlined in paragraph 41 above;

71. *Further requests* the Secretary-General, seeking perspectives from all relevant parties, to include every six months in his regular reports an update on the development and implementation of the integrated strategic framework referred to above, and *encourages* that this integrated strategic framework also includes a transition plan with a view to handing over relevant tasks to the UNCT based on their mandates and comparative advantages as well as on a mapping of capabilities and gaps, a resource mobilization strategy that involves the full range of multilateral and

bilateral partners, as well as a possible long-term exit strategy of the Mission on the basis of improved security and political conditions as well as of progress in the implementation of the Agreement;

72. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

United Nations S/2018/640

Security Council

Distr.: General
29 June 2018

Original: English

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling all its previous resolutions, including its resolution 2363 (2017), and statements of its President concerning the situation in Sudan, and underlining the importance of full compliance with these,

Noting with appreciation the Special Report of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the Strategic Review of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID),

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of Sudan and its determination to work with the Government of Sudan, in full respect of its sovereignty, to assist in tackling the various challenges in Sudan,

Determining that the situation in Sudan continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

1. *Decides* to extend until 13 July 2018 the mandate of UNAMID;

2. *Decides*, acting under Chapter VII, to extend the authorisations to take the necessary action set out in paragraph 15 of its resolution 1769 (2007), as further elaborated in paragraph 15 of its resolution 2363 (2017), and *urges* UNAMID to continue to deter any threats against itself and its mandate;

3. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

18-10825 (E) 020718

Please recycle

United Nations S/2018/641

Security Council

Distr.: General
27 June 2018

Original: English

Letter dated 27 June 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the utmost pleasure and honour to attach herewith the Khartoum Declaration, signed today, 27 June 2018, by the parties to the conflict in the sisterly Republic of South Sudan, to bring peace (see annex).

Having brought this matter to your attention, I would be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Omer Dahab Fadl **Mohamed**
Permanent Representative

18-10598 (E) 020718

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 27 June 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Khartoum Declaration of Agreement between Parties of the Conflict of South Sudan

Whereas H.E. Omer Hassan Ahmed El-Bashir, President of the Republic of Sudan was entrusted by the 32nd Extra-Ordinary Summit of IGAD on South Sudan, convened in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 21st June 2018, to facilitate a second round of face-to-face discussion between H.E. Salva Kiir Miyardit and Dr. Riek Machar Teny to resolve the outstanding issues on governance and security arrangements,

Whereas H.E. Omer El-Bashir is entrusted further to discuss measures to be taken to rehabilitate the economy of the Republic of South Sudan through bilateral cooperation with the Republic of Sudan,

Whereas H.E. Omer El-Bashir facilitated direct meetings between H.E. Salva Kiir Miyardit and Dr. Riek Machar Teny from 25th to 26th June 2018, the first of which was graciously attended by H.E. Yoweri Museveni, the President of Uganda,

Whereas H.E. Omer El-Bashir also convened on 26th June 2018 a session of talks with other political parties of the Republic of South Sudan which discussed the same issues,

Whereas the Ministers of Petroleum of the Republic of Sudan and the Republic of South Sudan and their technical teams explored extensively all possible avenues of cooperation between the two sisterly countries for rehabilitating the petroleum sector of the Republic of South Sudan,

Whereas H.E. Salva Kiir Miyardit, Dr. Riek Machar Teny and all other leaders of the South Sudanese are fully cognizant of their historical responsibility at this crucial juncture of their country and determined to work together hand in hand for the sake of the South Sudanese people,

H.E. Salava Kiir Miyardit, Dr. Riak Machar Teny and other signatories approved the following Declaration of Agreement:

1. A permanent ceasefire is hereby declared throughout the Republic of South Sudan and shall enter into force within seventy two (72) hours of signing of this Declaration of Agreement. The permanent ceasefire shall be based on the Cessation of Hostilities (COH) Agreement signed on December 21, 2017. Within seventy two (72) hours of signing this Declaration of Agreement the parties shall agree on all the ceasefire arrangements including disengagement, separation of forces in close proximity, withdrawal of allied troops, opening of humanitarian corridors, and release of prisoners of war and political detainees. All relevant provisions of the Agreement on Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (ARCSS) shall apply unless it is agreed otherwise. The parties shall agree on self-monitoring mechanisms. Furthermore, IGAD and African Union member states are kindly invited to deploy the necessary forces to supervise the agreed permanent ceasefire.

2. The security arrangements that shall be adopted shall aim at building national army, police and other security organs of an all-inclusive character that shall be free from tribalism and ethnic affiliations. Policies shall also be agreed upon for the disarmament of civilians all over the country.

3. An agreement on the "Revised Bridging Proposal" shall be concluded as soon as possible and before closing the current Khartoum Round of Talks. After concluding the agreement on the "Revised Bridging Proposal" a Pre-Transitional Period of 120 days shall commence to be followed by a Transitional Period of

thirty six (36) months. Sharing of power during the Transitional Period shall be in accordance with the formula that shall be agreed in the "Revised Bridging Proposal". During the Transitional Period the country shall be prepared for national elections that shall be conducted as agreed in the revitalized ARCSS. It is agreed that the election shall be open for all political parties and shall be free and fair.

4. Efforts for improving the infrastructure and basic services in the Republic of South Sudan, particularly in the sectors most connected with the livelihood of citizens, shall be intensified. The parties appeal to the international community to help in this regard.

5. The security of the oil fields in Unity State (Blocks 1, 2, and 4) and Tharjiath (Block 5A) is the responsibility of all South Sudan citizens. If need be, the Government of South Sudan, while undertaking its security duties, shall work in this regard in collaboration and coordination with the Government of Sudan. The Government of South Sudan in collaboration with the Government of Sudan shall immediately rehabilitate the oil fields identified above, and others as would be agreed upon, for the resumption and the restoration of the previous levels of oil production. All the outstanding issues related to the oil sector, particularly on the cost of oil field rehabilitation, shall be technically assessed and economically valued by the relevant authorities of South Sudan and Sudan respectively. Each party is entitled to seek the support of an impartial technical third party for independently verifying the assessments but without causing delay in the joint operations. Such data/information shall provide guidance for any political decision that may be undertaken by the leaders of the two sisterly countries. The Government of South Sudan is committed to use the petroleum proceeds to improve the livelihood of South Sudanese and to alleviate poverty and suffering.

Done in the Republican Palace, Khartoum, the Republic of Sudan, on this Day 27th of June 2018.

(*Signed*) H.E. Salva Kiir Myardit
President of the Republic of South Sudan

(*Signed*) Dr. Riek Machar Teny
Chairman — SPLM/IO

(*Signed*) Representative of South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA)

(*Signed*) Representative of Former Detainees (FD)

(*Signed*) Representatives of Other Political Parties (OPP)

Guarantor

(*Signed*) H.E. Omer Hassan Ahmed El-Bashir
President of the Republic of Sudan

Witnesses:

(*Signed*) For IGAD Special Envoy:

(*Signed*) For the Troika:

United Nations S/2018/642

Security Council

Distr.: General
29 June 2018
English
Original: Russian

Letter dated 27 June 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith information bulletins from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic for 26 and 27 June 2018 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) V. **Nebenzia**

18-10804 (E) 020718 030718

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 27 June 2018 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (26 June 2018)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

The Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported four incidents of gunfire in the following Governorates: two in Ladhiqiyah, one in Aleppo and one in Idlib.

The Turkish representative office has not reported any incidents of gunfire.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

The Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has not carried out any humanitarian operations over the past 24 hours.

In total, 1,844 humanitarian operations have been carried out.

The total weight of humanitarian cargo delivered is 2,692.56 tons.

Over the past 24 hours, medical assistance has been provided to 107 residents, including 48 children.

In total, medical assistance has been provided to 85,574 residents.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

No ceasefire agreements have been signed over the past 24 hours.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process is 2,518.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 234.

Information bulletin from the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence regarding the status of implementation of the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas (27 June 2018)

Observance of the ceasefire regime

Monitoring groups have continued to monitor observance of the ceasefire regime as part of implementing the Memorandum on the creation of de-escalation areas in the Syrian Arab Republic, signed by the Russian Federation, the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran on 4 May 2017.

The situation in the de-escalation areas has been assessed as stable.

The Russian representative office of the Russian and Turkish Joint Commission reviewing issues related to violations of the ceasefire regime has reported eight incidents of gunfire in Ladhiqiyah Governorate.

The Turkish representative office has not reported any incidents of gunfire.

Provision of humanitarian aid to the population of the Syrian Arab Republic

Over the past 24 hours, the Centre for Reconciliation of Opposing Sides in the Syrian Arab Republic has carried out two humanitarian operations: one in Qadiriyah, Hama Governorate (650 food parcels with a total weight of 2.8 tons were delivered to people in need); and one in Misraba, Rif Dimashq Governorate (650 food parcels with a total weight of 2.8 tons were delivered to people in need).

In total, 1,846 humanitarian operations have been carried out.

The total weight of humanitarian cargo delivered is 2,698.16 tons.

Over the past 24 hours, medical assistance has been provided to 353 residents.

In total, medical assistance has been provided to 84,927 residents.

Reconciliation of opposing sides

No ceasefire agreements have been signed over the past 24 hours.

The number of populated areas that have joined the reconciliation process is 2,518.

The number of armed groups that have announced their commitment to accepting and fulfilling the terms of the ceasefire is unchanged — it is still 234.